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ABSTRACT 
 
The number of refugees worldwide has never been higher, with an estimate of 65.3 million 
forcibly displaced persons by the end of 2015. The brunt of the material, economic and social 
burdens these waves of often destitute persons represent is borne by a minority of close-
proximity States, ill-equipped to handle mass influxes of people in dire need of protection and 
assistance. This dissertation explores the legal obligations of States to share the burden of 
international refugees, through four select research questions. Firstly, the existence of universal 
and regional obligations to burden-share are examined. Secondly, the legality of the ‘third safe 
country’ notion is examined under international law. Thirdly, the economic responsibilities of 
refugee-generating States towards refugees, asylum States and the UNHCR is examined. 
Fourthly, the obligations of States to rescue asylum seekers in distress at sea, and to process 
their asylum claims is examined. The fundamental observation of the dissertation is that 
although the 1951 Convention provides a generous set of rights to persecuted persons, its 
primary shortcoming in the context of this dissertation, is the lack of a clear and positive 
obligation, ensuring a fair distribution of the burdens of refugees between the signatory States. 
However, regional efforts do, to a degree, mitigate this issue by establishing obligations which 
seek to distribute the costs and burdens of refugees. 
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CHAPTER 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
While refugees are not a modern phenomenon, it was only in the nineteenth century 
that their legal status came to be of international relevance, when treaties regulating 
non-extradition of political offenders were ratified.1 The earliest international legal 
instruments regulating the status of refugees were case-specific and limited to 
particular ethnic categories of refugees.2 The office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 1950, and The United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees3 (1951 Convention) was adopted the following year, with the 
specific situation of European post-World War II refugees in mind. Today, more than 
65 years after the 1951 Convention entered into force, it remains the primary 
international legal instrument relating to the protection of refugees — although it is 
regulating a wholly different and more complex global situation than the one it was 
originally intended to mitigate.  
The 1951 Convention was drafted in the wake of the Second World War, which 
left behind a Europe in ruins, with a vast number of forcibly displaced persons.4 It was 
recognised by the drafters that the protection of displaced persons could not simply be 
achieved by repatriating refugees to the allied-controlled areas they originated from. 
This recognition is evidenced by the relatively generous rights afforded refugees in 
the Convention. 
  An example of the perceived need of the time to protect refugees is found in 
Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention. The Article places a positive legal obligation 
on the signatory States to respect the principle of non-refoulement — hence not to 
‘expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
																																																						
1 Agnes Hurwitz The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (2009) 10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 United Nations, General Assembly Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 137. 
4 More than 2.2 million Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II, see Bernard 
Wasserstein ‘European Refugee Movements After World War Two’ BBC 17 February 2011, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/refugees_01.shtml., accessed on 20 
April 2017. 
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territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’5  
While the 1951 Convention afford refugees both protection and a selection of 
basic rights, the Convention offers limited support in deciphering whether the 
signatory States are legally obliged to assist each other with the financial and socio-
political burdens of receiving refugees. Nonetheless, this aspect of the international 
protection of refugees was not simply overlooked by the drafters. Based on its 
experience with refugees after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), France suggested 
a provision in the Preamble to the 1951 Convention that would acknowledge the 
extraordinary burden often inflicted on receiving States. The provision was, after 
objections leading to several amendments,6 unanimously accepted by the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries: 
[C]onsidering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations 
has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation.7 
The provision expresses a clear recognition of the burden which the granting of asylum 
to refugees signify to the asylum State. Importantly, the provision recognises this 
burden as an international problem, which in turn demands an international solution 
through cooperation.  
However, the original provision suggested by France was significantly more 
specific, and placed substantial importance on burden-sharing, while recognising the 
consequences that geographical location may wreak on close-proximity States:  
[C]onsidering that the exercise of the right of asylum places an undue burden on 
certain countries because of their geographical situation, and that a satisfactory 
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international 
scope and nature cannot be achieved without international co-operation to help to 
distribute refugees throughout the world.8 (Emphasis added). 
																																																						
5 1951 Convention supra (n3) Article 1 (A) (2). 
6 Marjoleine Zieck ‘“Quota Refugees”: The Dutch Contribution to Global “Burden Sharing” by 
Means of Resettlement of Refugees’ (2011) International Journal of Legal Info, Vol. 39 130-163 at 
137. 
7 1951 Convention supra (n3) Preamble, para. 4. 
8 UN Doc E/L.81, 29 July 1950, Rochefort, France. 
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While the original provision was remarkably clear in pinpointing central issues of 
distribution of cost and responsibility, the current wording only provides a vague sense 
of moral duty to take on a portion of the cost of international refugees. Even so, the 
final wording make for a stark contrast to the reality of burden-sharing in the refugee 
regime of today,9 as States scramble to avoid both costs and responsibilities. 
The European management of the international refugee crisis was, already 20 
years ago, compared to the classic prisoner’s dilemma.10 Applied to the refugee 
situation, a State, in lieu of positive legal obligations prescribing an equitable 
distribution of refugees, ‘risks being punished for a liberal attitude towards refugee 
reception.’11 The punishment stems from the reluctance of other States to receive or 
contribute to the reception of refugees, which in turn forces States with liberal asylum-
policies to receive a disproportionate number of refugees. If, on the other hand, States 
were to cooperate in a transparent and equitable manner, the crisis of today would 
arguably be more predictable and less overwhelming. This would benefit both asylum 
States and refugees.  
 
II RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The number of refugees worldwide has never been higher, with an estimate of 65.3 
million forcibly displaced persons by the end of 2015.12 At the same time, the brunt 
of the material, economic and social burdens these waves of often destitute persons 
represent is borne by a minority of close-proximity States, ill-equipped to handle mass 
influxes13 of people in dire need of protection and assistance.14  
																																																						
9 Although the word ‘burden’ does not have the most sympathetic ring to it, refugees do at least in a 
short-term perspective, represent significant financial costs for the receiving State.  
10 Gregor Noll ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma in Fortress Europe’ (1997) 40 GYIL 405-437. 
11 Ibid at 411. 
12 UNHCR ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015’ available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf, accessed on 2 May 2017. 
13 The ExCom Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in 
Mass Influx Situations No. 100 (LV) – 2004 (GA document A/AC.96/1003) defines a ‘mass influx’ 
as a situation comprised of some or more of the following characteristics: ‘(i) considerable numbers 
of people arriving over an international border; (ii) a rapid rate or arrival, (iii) inadequate absorption 
or response capacity in host States, particularly during the emergency; (iv) individual asylum 
procedures, where they exist, which are unable to deal with the assessment of such large numbers.’ 
14 UNHCR estimates that 84 per cent of the world's refugees are hosted in developing regions, see 
UNHCR ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016’ at 2, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-
2016.html, accessed on 10 June 2017. 
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The current European refugee-crisis, labelled as such due to the massive, recent 
influxes of asylum seekers to Europe, is indeed of record proportions, with more than 
twice the number of refugees in Europe than after the fall of the Berlin Wall.15 
Nevertheless, the legal responsibilities and obligations of States to provide protection 
for refugees is still primarily depending on the 1951 Convention and its appending 
Protocol of 1967.16 While the 1951 Convention affords the refugee a set of rights upon 
arrival in the asylum State, the Convention is silent on the aspects of economics, 
security, and stability of the receiving State — all core aspects of States behaviour in 
the current crisis.17 As asylum seekers move towards Europe, European countries 
experience a surge in right-wing populist policy.18 Meanwhile, States perceived as 
benign asylum destinations scramble to avoid the increasing costs of protection, 
through the adoption of policies which purpose is to make themselves look less 
attractive to asylum seekers.19 Thus, as the title of this paper suggests, this scenario 
promotes a sordid game of musical chairs, where States rush to adopt repelling 
policies, in turn forcing asylum seekers to play the same game, however involuntary. 
When the dismantling of national refugee protection mechanisms becomes a measure 
of defence against consequences of mass influx, the inadequacy of the 1951 
Convention in modern times becomes apparent, and the obligations of States to share 
and distribute the burdens of refugees grows in importance.  
 
																																																						
15 See Phillip Connor ‘Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015’ Pew 
Research Center 2 August 2016, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-
refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/, accessed on 2 May 2016. 
16 United Nations, General Assembly Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 31 January 1967, 
606 UNTS 267.  
17 According to the Fiscal Council of Sweden, the estimated average annual cost per refugee starts at 
above €14 000 for the first year of asylum. See OECD Migration Policy Debates No. 13 January 
2017 at 6, available at: https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf, accessed on 
2 May 2017. 
18 At the time of writing, Austria’s FPÖ, a party promoting and anti-immigration policies, is polling 
around at nearly 20 per cent. In Hungary, the governing party Fidesz is increasing anti-immigration 
rhetoric. See Thomas Greven ‘Right-Wing Populism and Authoritarian Nationalism in the U.S. and 
Europe’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 3 May 2017 at 3, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/id/13395.pdf, accessed on 2 May 2017. 
19 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Helle Malmvig ‘The Ugly Duckling: Denmark’s Anti-Refugee 
Policies and Europe’s Race to the Bottom’ Huffington Post 4 May 2016, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-gammeltofthansen/denmark-refugee-
europe_b_9574538.html, accessed on 5 April 2017. 
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III THE AIM OF THE DISSERTATION AND THE RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
After the First World War and a typhus epidemic in Poland demanded international 
cooperation, it was timely noted by Schwarzenberger that ‘[n]o compulsion exists for 
a State to join in any such cooperative effort. It is its own self-interest which prompts 
it to do so.’20   This paper aims to clarify the limits of the legal obligations of States to 
share the burden of refugees, and will in doing so examine whether the near-century 
old observation noted above still holds true. 
While the overwhelming majority of refugees today are situated in the global 
south, wealthy northern States close their borders21 and decrease financial 
contributions which might prevent further migratory flows.22 The unsustainable 
situation of the current refugee crisis, as well as the rapid increase in forcibly displaced 
persons,23 make this dissertation particularly pertinent as it will examine the 
obligations of States to share the material and socio-political burdens of refugees. The 
concepts of State sovereignty and State responsibility will be explored to create the 
necessary backdrop for the discussion of the legal obligation to share the burden of 
international refugees. Central provisions of the 1951 Convention will be objects of 
thorough examination. Due to the reluctance of States to assume financial 
responsibilities of unknown proportions, the relevant treaties are expected to provide 
an insufficient basis for the claim of a common, international obligation to share the 
burden of international refugees. Accordingly, customary international law will play 
an important role in this paper. 
The main research question is whether international law obliges States to 
contribute to the mitigation of the refugee-crisis in an equitable manner. This question 
will be examined through a selection of relevant sub-questions, which all flow from 
this overarching research problem.  
																																																						
20 Guy S Goodwin-Gil & Jane McAdam The Refugee in International Law 3ed (2007) 502. 
21 As of March 2016, five south-eastern European countries have closed their borders. See Aamna 
Mohdin ‘No Entry’ Quartz 10 March 2016, available at https://qz.com/635110/these-are-the-
routes-being-closed-off-to-refugees-fleeing-into-europe/, accessed on 18 April 2017. 
22 Scandinavian countries are reported to drastically cut their foreign aid contributions as domestic 
refugee-aid spending increases. See Adam Moe Fejerskov and Niels Keijzer ‘Why Slashing Foreign 
Aid in Europe to Pay for Refugees Won’t Help Solve the Long-Term Crisis’ Huffington Post 23 
December 2015, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-moe-fejerskov/foreign-aid-
europe-refugee-crisis_b_8869794.html, accessed on 2 July 2017. 
23 UNHCR op cit (n14) 2. 
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The minor research questions are as follows: 
- Is the ‘third safe country’ concept legal under international law, and if so, 
under what limitations? 
- Can refugee-producing States be held financially responsible for the cost 
inflicted on the individual refugee, the UNHCR and the States that receive 
refugees?  
- What obligations rest with States to rescue asylum seekers in distress at sea, 
and who bears the responsibility of processing and protecting the applicants 
once rescued?  
 
IV STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
The structural problem-basis for this dissertation becomes evident when one examine 
the current state of the world’s refugees. Although the influxes of asylum seekers to 
Europe are substantial24 in comparison to previous influxes of the kind, the clear 
majority of refugees today are situated in developing nations which lack the resources 
to cope with both the economic and socio-political consequences of protecting and 
processing large numbers of asylum seekers.25  
This further entrenches the populations of these regions in poverty and social 
disruptions, laying stones to the burden of nations that are already struggling. For 
example,  91 per cent of Lebanese respondents perceived ‘the threat of Syrian 
refugees’ as a major security concern for the country in 2014,26 while the Tanzanian 
government maintained that its hosting of refugees is so costly that it cannot 
adequately provide for its citizens.27 The reluctance of developed States to share in 
these burdens clearly represent a moral fallacy — the research problem of this 
																																																						
24 The Statistics bureau of the European Commission, Eurostat, found that about 1.3 million persons 
claimed asylum in the EU in both 2015 and 2016, amounting to approximately double the number 
recorded in the EU during the previous relative peak of 1992. See Eurostat ‘Asylum Statistics’ 
2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics, 
accessed on 2 August 2017. 
25 According to UNHCR, 84 per cent of the refugees under their mandate are hosted in developing 
regions. UNHCR op cit (n14) at 2. 
26 Hovig Wannis ‘Security Threat Perceptions in Lebanon’ Background Paper, International Alert 
(2014), available at data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=8911, accessed on 2 June 
2017. 
27 Patricia Ongpin ‘Refugees in Tanzania – Asset or Burden?’ (2008) 1 FMR 13-23 at 15. 
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dissertation is whether this fallacy translates into legal obligations for developed States 
to contribute in an equal manner. 
 
VI LITERATURE REVIEW  
Conventions that will be central items of interpretation are the following: The 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1970 Convention on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 
the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
and various relevant UN Handbooks and UNHCR Executive Commission 
Conclusions. 
Several of the most prominent scholars of refugee law will be sourced when 
answers to the research questions of this dissertation are to be sought. Among the 
general frameworks are Goodwin-Gil & McAdam’s staple work The Refugee in 
International Law (2007) and Hathaway’s The Rights of the Refugee under 
International Law (2005). While these authors have written extensively on the rights 
of refugees and the obligations of States to protect them, the coverage of the particular 
questions of this dissertation is limited, due to their specific nature.  
There are, however, articles written by both Goodwin-Gil and Hathaway, as 
well as other scholars, relating more directly to the subject matter of the research 
questions. One of the relevant articles is Fonteyne’s ‘Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of 
the Nature and Function of International Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of 
Refugees’; which gave a positive, yet unfortunately incorrect prediction of the present 
level of burden-sharing in international refugee law. Another central work to this 
dissertation is Shucks article ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing – A Modest Proposal,’ which 
alongside Hathaway & Neve’s ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: 
A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’ argues that the sharing 
of responsibilities among States is necessary for the adequate protection of the world’s 
refugees, while proposing slightly different solutions to how such cooperation should 
come about. Furthermore, Anker, Fitzpatrick and Shacknove’s response to Hathaway, 
Neve and Shuck’s respective articles; ‘Crisis and Cure – A reply to Hathaway/Neve 
and Schuck’, provides a relevant critique of the premises which the abovementioned 
articles are based on. While these articles revolve around the lack of effective burden-
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sharing and thus effective protection in the current refugee regime, their contact points 
to the specific questions of this dissertations are limited. However, the materials listed 
above provide, in combination, a solid point of departure for further research into the 
questions of this dissertation. 
Finally, other secondary sources such as Hurwitz’ The Collective 
Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (2009); Achiumes ‘Syria, Cost sharing 
and the Responsibility to Protect’; Eggli’s ‘Mass influx and the Limits of Public 
International Law’; Barnes’ ‘Refugee Law at Sea’; Blocher & Gulati ‘Competing for 
Refugees’ and Marjoleine Zieck ‘Quota Refugees: The Dutch contribution’ are all 
relevant secondary sources providing valuable background information and analyses 
to be drawn from in both the research for, and the writing of this dissertation.  
 
VII RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This dissertation will primarily examine and analyse international sources of law to 
decipher what legal obligations rests with States to share the burden of refugees. These 
examinations will be undertaken through desktop research. The research questions 
will require analysis and assessment of treaties, conventions and customary 
international law. The primary sources of law will thus be the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). Other international 
conventions, treaties, and declarations will be drawn from, hereunder the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity 1969 Convention 
Concerning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which are all relevant 
primary sources of law in this context. Various relevant UN General Assembly 
Resolutions and Conclusions will also be drawn from. As the primary sources 
themselves are expected to place limited formal obligations on States in regard to the 
questions of this dissertation, potential developments of international customary law 
will have to be examined. For this undertaking, both the abovementioned sources of 
soft law as well as the literary works of scholars in refugee law will be sourced, 
alongside relevant international and domestic court decisions.  
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VIII CHAPTER SYNOPSIS 
1 Introduction 
The 1951 Convention constitutes the primary international legal framework relating 
to refugees. This first chapter outlines the research questions and the structure of the 
dissertation.  
2 The obligations of States to share the burden of refugees  
Whether States are legally obliged to share the burden of refugees in an equitable 
manner will be explored in this chapter, by examining the obligations of States to 
receive refuges through resettlement programs, and to burden-share fiscally. 
3 The ‘third safe country’ notion and the obligation of States to determine the status 
of asylum seekers 
This chapter will examine the legality of the widespread ‘safe third country’ practices, 
where States send asylum seekers back to a State the applicant has passed through, 
deemed safe enough to offer sufficient protection from persecution by the sending 
State.  
4 The obligation of States to cover the cost of generating refugees 
The possibility of holding the refugee-creating State liable for financial costs of caring 
for received refugees is alluring, as it would weaken incentives for States responsible 
for the creation of refugees, while providing the asylum State with a well-justified 
contribution to its protection of the fundamental human right of asylum. The question 
of whether States can, under international law, be held fiscally responsible for their 
creation of refugees and the cost this inflicts on refugees, asylum States and the 
UNHCR will be examined in this chapter.  
5 The obligation of States to rescue refugees at sea 
The obligations of States to rescue asylum seekers in distress at sea, and to allow 
disembarkation and processing of rescued applicants, are pertinent questions in light 
of the current European situation. This chapter will examine the question of rescue, as 
well as those of disembarkation and determination of refugee status.  
6 Conclusions 
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The final chapter will recapitulate the observations of the dissertation, and connect the 
research questions to burden-sharing in the refugee regime today.   
 
CHAPTER 2: THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO SHARE 
THE BURDEN OF REFUGEES 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will explore the main research question; whether States are legally 
obliged to share the burden of refugees in an equitable manner. The chapter will show 
how cooperation and burden-sharing are concepts frequently alluded to in 
international forums, before examining how these concepts are implemented both in 
global and regional refugee regimes. The chapter will focus on the most common and 
central aspects of burden-sharing, namely the physical relocation and settlement of 
refugees in third States through resettlement programs, and contributive fiscal 
transfers between States.  
As indicated in chapter one of this dissertation, the global refugee crisis yields 
vastly different effects on the world’s nations, depending on their geographical 
location. Four out of six of the top six asylum countries of the world are located in 
low-income countries in the politically volatile Middle East.28 Meanwhile, the global 
North is largely sheltered from immediate influxes of asylum seekers due to the sheer 
physical distance and the hindrance this constitutes to asylum seekers fleeing from the 
worlds conflict zones. However, as asylum seekers migrate towards Europe, the 
European countries closest to the African continent and the Middle East bear, in the 
European context, the brunt of the cost resulting from the reception of asylum seekers.  
This chapter consists of five subsections. The following section will explore 
the general duty of States to cooperate and to share the burden of refugees, while the 
third section will examine the obligation to accept quota refugees. The fourth section 
will examine some of the existing legal obligations to burden-share fiscally, while the 
fifth section will summarise the observations of the chapter. 
																																																						
28 Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, and Uganda are the top six refugee-hosting countries. 
See UNHCR op cit (n12) 3. 
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II THE DUTY OF STATES TO COOPERATE 
The duty of States to cooperate is outlined in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that: 
States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of the differences in 
their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international 
relations, in order to maintain international peace and security and to promote 
international economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and 
international cooperation free from discrimination based on such differences.29 
This principle of cooperation could easily be applied to international refugee law. 
Equitable contributions by the individual States to lessen the burdens borne by asylum 
countries, would clearly be in accordance with both the Declaration mentioned above 
and the UN Charter.30 However, none of these provisions place positive legal 
obligations on States to undertake measures to ensure an equitable sharing of the 
burdens related to refugees.  
The 1951 Convention refers in its preamble to the international nature of 
refugee flows and the need for burden-sharing. However, the preamble does not oblige 
the signatory States to contribute to the protection of asylum seekers and refugees 
outside of their territory; neither through fiscal transfers, nor through material aid or 
resettlement. Rather, the preamble seeks to illuminate the context in which the 1951 
Convention is to be interpreted.31 
Although the legal responsibility for protection, and thus also the costs inferred 
from receiving asylum seekers remain with first asylum States due to the principle of 
non-refoulement,32 States worldwide endorse the concepts of international solidarity 
and burden-sharing. Yet contributions largely remain ad-hoc and insufficient.33  
																																																						
29 United Nations, General Assembly The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nation, 24 October 1970, A/RES/25/2625(XXV) Principle (d): The duty of States to cooperate with 
one another in accordance with the Charter. 
30 A purpose of the United Nations is ‘[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of … humanitarian character…’ See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 
October 1945, 1 UNTS 16, Article 1 (3). 
31 United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 
31 (2). 
32 1951 Convention supra (n3) Article 33 (1). 
33 James C Hathaway & R Alexander Neve ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again – A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’ (1997) 10 HarvHumRtsJ 115-211 at 
117. 
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The UNHCR has long stressed the importance of burden-sharing, and in a 
recent Conclusion of October 2016 the Executive Committee (ExCom), referring to a 
long list of previous conclusions,34 was  
Reaffirming its commitment to international solidarity and responsibility- and burden-
sharing involving all members of the international community, and recalling the 
importance of international cooperation, in particular, to support communities and 
countries hosting large refugee populations, in ensuring protection and assistance and 
achieving solutions for refugees.35  
Furthermore, the Conclusion maintains that the Committee  
Commits to further strengthening of international cooperation and solidarity and 
equitable responsibility and burden sharing; and further urges all States and UNHCR 
to increase their efforts to implement these important principles, including through 
the provision of much needed support to host countries by mobilizing financial and 
other necessary resources, and ensure protection and assistance and realize durable 
solutions for refugees and for other persons of concern, as appropriate, in order to 
enhance the coping ability and resilience of host communities, as well as provide 
assistance in a more predictable, timely, sustainable and equitable and transparent 
way.36 
According to Hathaway and Foster, ExCom Conclusions must be considered sources 
of international law, that assist in establishing the purpose and object of the 1951 
Convention, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties37 
(VCLT) Article 31 (3) (a).38 Furthermore, it must be noted that the number of ExCom 
members is both high and correlative to the parties to the 1951 Convention, and that 
the Conclusions require agreement between the same signatories of the Convention 
before adaption. This supports the notion that the ExCom Conclusions contain the 
interpretations of the signatory States to the 1951 Convention, interpretations which 
should be heeded when the Convention is applied.39 
Accordingly, one could argue that an act to the contrary of the ExCom 
Conclusions would be incompatible with the principle of good faith as stipulated in 
																																																						
34 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI) 1980, No. 40 (XXXVI) 1985, No.52 
(XXXIX) 1988, No. 56(XL), No. 80(XLVII) 1996, No. 67 (XLII) 1991, No. 100 (LV) 2004, No. 
101 (LV) 2004, No. 104 (LVI) 2005, No. 105 (LVII) 2006 para (i), No. 107 (LVIII) 2007, para (b) 
(xiii), No. 109 (LX) 2009, No. 111 (LXIV) 2013, and No. 91 (LII) 2001. 
35 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 112 (LXVII) 2016. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Vienna Convention supra (n31). 
38 Alex Catalán Flores ‘Reconceiving “Burden-sharing” in international refugee law’ (2016) King’s 
Student Law Review, Vol. 7 40-51 at 41. 
39 See ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries’ (1966) 2 UNYBILC 187 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l at 221. 
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the UN Charter,40 seeing as the ExCom members have agreed to the interpretations 
laid down in their Conclusions. As held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ‘…the obligation to act in accordance with 
good faith, being a general principle of law, is also part of international law.’41 While 
a lack of good faith in the implementation of a treaty must be differentiated from a 
violation of the treaty itself, an act committed by a member of the ExCom which 
derogates from the Conclusions, would nonetheless constitute a breach of international 
law. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly has consistently expressed its support 
for these principles in its resolutions on the Office of the UNHCR.42 The stance of the 
international authorities is thus apparent, and yet, a clear legal obligation is lacking. 
As established in this section, there is no legal, universal obligation on States 
to aid one another with the burdens of refugees. The following section will examine 
the concept of resettlement, and whether States are obliged to receive refugees through 
such schemes. 
 
III QUOTA REFUGEES  
Also referred to as resettlement refugees, quota refugees are the refugees who are 
comparably fortunate enough to be resettled in a safe third country, thus cutting short 
the perilous journey most refugees undertake to reach their desired country of asylum. 
While providing the individual refugee with a safe place to rebuild her life, 
resettlement does simultaneously alleviate the first asylum State of the socioeconomic 
burden the refugee represented to it. In 2015, the UNHCR submitted 134 000 
applications for refugees to States for resettlement, of which 107 100 were resettled in 
third countries.43 This constitutes a mere 3.3 per cent of the total number of asylum 
seekers worldwide;44 a stark reminder of how the quota-system only resettles a fraction 
of the total number of persecuted persons.  
																																																						
40 The UN Charter Supra (n30) Article 2 (2) demands that ‘All members … shall fulfill in good faith 
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.’ 
41 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) 1957 ICJ Reports 9 at 53. 
42 Hurwitz op cit (n1) 143. 
43 UNHCR op cit (n12) 3. 
44 Ibid. According to the UNHCR, 3.2 million applicants were waiting for decisions by the end of 
2015. 
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Although repatriation of refugees is the preferred solution of the UNHCR,45 
resettlement schemes have long been one of the durable solutions for people fleeing 
from persecution. While the UNHCR has expanded the definition of the term ‘refugee’ 
to include persons fleeing from human rights violations and generalised violence and 
thus including them under their mandate, only persons considered to be refugees under 
the 1951 Convention are assigned for resettlement by the UNHCR.46 This is due to the 
lack of resettlement places and the fact that most receiving States apply the narrower 
definition as provided for in the 1951 Convention.47 This forces the UNHCR to only 
assign refugees who are under the most immediate threats for resettlement.48  
While Fonteyne as early as in 1983 argued that burden-sharing was a rule of 
customary international law due to  
[t]he widespread pattern of recognition, coupled with its repeated application in State 
practice, [which] seems to leave little room indeed for doubt concerning the legal 
nature of the principle, and its binding characters for States, at least within the 
framework of UN Charter law,49  
State practice in the wake of this statement is neither uniform nor conclusive enough 
to establish a legally binding rule of customary law pertaining to the aspect of 
resettlement.50 Unfortunately, it is clear that ‘[n]o country is legally obliged to resettle 
refugees.’51 Nonetheless, the number of States accepting resettlement refugees is 
currently rising,52 which demonstrates how physical burden-sharing occur, albeit 
based on political commitment to aid refugees, and not legal obligations. The 
following section will examine regional undertakings of physical and fiscal burden-
sharing, and whether they create legal obligations on the States partaking in them. 
 
																																																						
45 United Nations, General Assembly Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, 14 December 1950, A/RES/428(V) para 9. 
46 1951 Convention supra (n3) Article 1 (A) (2). 
47 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, Ch. 7.4.5, available at http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf, 
accessed on 2 July 2017. 
48 Zieck op cit (n6) 156. 
49 J-PL Fonteyne ‘Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International Solidarity 
in cases of Mass Influx of Refugees’ (1978-1980) 8 AustYBIL 162-188 at 184. 
50 Hurwitz op cit (n1) 161. 
51 UNHCR op cit (n47) 36. 
52 From 27 countries in 2014 to 33 in 2015. See UNHCR op cit (n12) at 26. 
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IV REGIONAL, LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO SHARE THE BURDEN 
OF REFUGEES 
Physical burden-sharing in the European Union 
As of 2008, the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union53 (TFEU) 
obligates the Member States to ‘develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection … ensuring compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement.’54 Furthermore, the same treaty prescribes that the Union shall adopt a 
‘common European asylum system’ which should determine responsibility in between 
the member States for processing asylum applicants.55 Article 80 of the TFEU requires 
that the member States implement this rule in their relevant domestic legislation, as 
the legislation of each member State ‘shall be governed by the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the 
Member States.’ As the TFEU is ratified by the member States, they are legally 
obliged to act in accordance with it. However, the obligations set forth in the TFEU 
does not clarify how solidarity is achieved, nor what constitutes ‘fair sharing’ of 
responsibilities under the treaty.  
The treaty would, interpreted in the ordinary meaning of its words,56 invoke a 
notion of proportionality and therefore make the fair and solidary sharing of 
responsibilities relative to the capacity of each member State. The European 
Parliament has defined the concept of ‘solidarity’ under Article 80 as ‘unity or 
agreement of action that produces or is based on community of interests, objectives, 
and standards.’57 The concept is intended to ensure support to the ‘Member States 
which … on account of geographical and demographic factors, carry a heavier burden 
of responsibility than others.’58 From this, it must be concluded that the member States 
of the European Union (EU) are under a general legal obligation to assist one another 
by sharing the burden of asylum applicants and refugees.  
																																																						
53 European Union Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
C 115, 9 May 2008. 
54 Ibid Article 78. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Vienna Convention supra (n31).  
57 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs ‘Working document on Article 80 TFEU – 
Solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including search and rescue obligations (INI report on 
the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration)’ (2015) 
DT\1067814EN.doc at 3. 
58 Ibid. 
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The Council of the European Union (The Council) decided in 2015 that more 
than 120 000 asylum applicants were to be relocated from Italy and Greece to EU 
States located further away from these first asylum countries.59 The European 
Commission reported in May 2017 that ‘almost all Member States are … relocating 
[refugees] from Italy and Greece,’ thus complying with their obligations as prescribed 
by the Council Decision, and thus with TFEU Article 80.  
Hungary, Poland and Austria were the only non-contributing States with 
regards to the relocation of refugees, and were according to the Commission violating 
their legal obligations.60 The mentioned countries are currently disputing the legality 
of the Council Decision, and the case is at the time of writing being assessed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).61 This is a palpable sign of the binding nature of the 
Decision. Moreover, the Council Decision does limit the options of member States 
who wish to avoid partaking in the relocation scheme. Non-participation is conditional 
on ‘exceptional circumstances’ that make the member State ‘temporarily unable to 
take part in the relocation process of up to 30 per cent of applicants allocated to it…’ 
As of these restrictions, only a relatively small derogation from the stipulated numbers 
are possible.  
Moreover, such an exception needs to be ‘duly justified’ by the State.62 An 
antithetic interpretation of the decision thus makes it clear that it is a legally binding 
instrument, obligating EU States to a minimum of burden-sharing. While awaiting the 
ECJ’s decision, it can be concluded that the TFEU and the Council Decision illustrate 
how the EU operates with legal obligations intended to relocate and resettle refugees 
between its member States. 
 
Physical burden-sharing in Africa 
While the 1951 Convention does not provide the global community with positive legal 
obligations to burden-share by way of resettlement, the Convention Governing the 
																																																						
59 See Council of the European Union Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 Establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ 
L 248, 24 September 2015, Article 4. 
60 Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
12th report on Relocation and Resettlement, Strasbourg, 16 May 2017 at 3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Council Decision (EU) supra (n59) Article 4 (5). 
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Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) does provide its 
signatory States with an unambiguous obligation to burden-share:  
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such 
Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and 
such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-
operation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State 
granting asylum.63 (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly, the OAU Convention places a positive obligation on its member States 
to assist one another in times of need. However, what ‘appropriate measures’ entail, 
is not clarified by the OAU Convention. Neither does history provide any examples 
of this particular African solidarity, where the Article has been invoked with the 
consequence of the burden of asylum seekers and refugees being distributed.64 
 
Legal obligations to fiscal burden-sharing on the regional level  
Although there is no evidence to suggest the existence of a legal obligation to burden-
share on a global level; neither fiscally nor physically,65 there are examples of 
obligations to share financial burdens on the regional level. An example is the Cotonou 
Agreement, ratified by the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
as a legal framework for the cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries. 
Chapter 6 of the Agreement deals with humanitarian and emergency assistance, and 
provides that such assistance  
shall be accorded to the population in ACP States faced with serious economic and 
social difficulties of an exceptional nature resulting from natural disasters, man-made 
crises such as wars and other conflicts or extraordinary circumstances having 
comparable effects. The humanitarian and emergency assistance shall be maintained 
for as long as necessary to deal with the emergency needs resulting from these 
situations.66 (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, the assistance provided  
shall aim to … address the needs arising from the displacement of people (refugees, 
displaced persons and returnees) following natural or man-made disasters so as to 
meet, for as long as necessary, all the needs of refugees and displaced persons 
																																																						
63 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45, Article 2 (4). 
64 Ncumisa Willie & Popo Mfubu ‘Responsibility Sharing: Towards a Unified Refugee Protection 
Framework in Africa’ (2016) 2 AHMR No 3 542-567 at 555. 
65 Hurwitz op cit (n1) 163. 
66 Cotonou Agreement, Partnership Agreement 2000/483/EC between the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the EU, of the other part, OJ L 317, 15 December 
2012, Article 72 (1). 
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(wherever they may be) and facilitate action for their voluntary repatriation and re-
integration in their country of origin… 
The wording of the Agreement is positively binding, and obligates the EU to provide 
ACP States with humanitarian aid of relatively generous proportions, in order to 
address all needs arising from the displacement of persons. However, there is a 
threshold which might be interpreted restrictively before such aid is dispensed; the 
ACP State in need must face ‘serious economic and social difficulties of an 
exceptional nature’ before the EU is obliged to assist. The restrictive wording severely 
limits the scope of this obligation. 
Internally, the EU has seen a development in fiscal burden-sharing programs 
in relation to mass influxes of asylum seekers. The European Refugee Fund (ERF) 
was created with the objective of redistributing financial resources proportionate to 
the economic burdens borne by member States.67 At its time of creation it was 
characterised as the ‘most ambitious attempt to institutionalise refugee burden-sharing 
in the EU.’68 The fund allocates a lump sum to each member State, before disbursing 
the remaining funds relative to the number of asylum seekers the individual Member 
State had received over the last three years.69 The ERF was in 2013 absorbed into the 
newly created Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF),70 covering the period 
of 2014 to 2020 with a budget of €3.137 billion.71 The expressed purpose of the AMIF 
is, among others, ‘to enhance solidarity and responsibility-sharing between the 
Member States, in particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum 
flows, including through practical cooperation.’72 As the AMIF is funded through 
appropriation, authorised by the European Parliament and the Council, taken from the 
multi annual budget financed by the Member States,73 the fund stands as an example 
of a mandatory method of financial burden-sharing within the European Union. 
																																																						
67 James C Hathaway & Michelle Foster The Law of Refugee Status (2014) 293. 
68 Eiko R Thielemann ‘Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing: Redistribution, Side-payments 
and the European Refugee Fund’ (2005) 43 JComMarSt No. 4 807-824 at 816. 
69 European Commission on Migration and Home Affairs webpage, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/refugee-fund_en, 
accessed on 15 July 2017. 
70 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 Establishing the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing 
Decisions 2007/435/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Council Decision 2007/435/EC, OJ L 150, 16 April 2014. 
71 AMIF website, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-
asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund_en, accessed on 1 July 2017. 
72 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 supra (n70) Article 3 (2) (d). 
73 Ibid Article 14 (2). 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in this chapter, there are no universal legal obligations to share the burden 
of refugees and asylum seekers, either through resettlement or through fiscal transfers. 
However, regional legal obligations to relocate both funds and asylum seekers do 
exist, and are growing in importance, as evidenced by the uneven distribution of 
asylum seekers in regional scenarios. Of particular relevance to burden-sharing in 
Europe is the supranational legislation adopted through the Councils Directives, 
prescribing Member States with legal obligations to share both responsibilities and 
costs of refugees.   
CHAPTER 3: THE ‘THIRD SAFE COUNTRY’ NOTION 
AND THE AVOIDANCE OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
TOWARDS REFUGEES 
	
I INTRODUCTION 
Violent and oppressive regimes persecuting ethnic, religious and political minorities 
are not an irregular occurrence. Neither is the phenomenon of persecuted persons 
escaping such regimes. However, the technology of the modern world offers 
unprecedented ease of both global communication and travel. Accessible information 
regarding the physical safety and the (perceived) economic benefits and prospects of 
the global North has, in combination with a more accessible international 
transportation system, led to unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers reaching the 
shores74 and borders of developed countries.75  
The combined practices of visa requirements and carrier-sanctions, alongside 
a previously less accessible transportation system, have long constituted effective 
barriers hindering asylum seekers from reaching the territories of developed countries, 
as protection largely depends on the applicants’ physical presence within the asylum 
State. 
																																																						
74 Unfortunately, not all people who set out for Europe by way of sea, reach its shores. See Chapter 5. 
75 A large portion of asylum seekers actively use social media to gain strategic information, aiding 
them in the migration towards countries of asylum. See Rianne Dekker & Godfried Engbersen 
‘How Social Media Transform Migrant Networks and Facilitate Migration’ (2014) Global 
Networks, Vol. 14, Issue 4 401-418 at 410. 
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The principle of non-refoulement is intrinsically linked to the questions of 
responsibility and burden-sharing, as it constitutes the non-derogable nexus between 
an asylum State and an asylum seeker,76 rendering the State obligated to protect the 
individual. As noted by Neve and Hathaway, western States have ‘sought to avoid the 
arrival of refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence’77 since the fading of 
the interest-convergence between them and refugees.78 As legal obligations only arise 
once asylum seekers are under the effective or formal control of a State,79 western 
States have manipulated the distribution of refugees that would ensue from a sincere 
application of the principle of non-refoulement. This has primarily been done through 
the implementation of non-entrée policies.80 Visa requirements, commonly placed on 
nationals of refugee-generating States, coupled with fines levied on carriers who 
transport such nationals in contradiction of said visa requirements, have insulated 
western States from asylum seekers, and the obligations and burdens that their arrival 
entail.81 
The ‘safe third country’ concept labels certain countries as safe, in order to 
relieve the sending State of its responsibilities towards certain asylum seekers.82 If the 
applicant has travelled through a State labelled safe by the sending State, the applicant 
may be deported. Thus, the concept seeks to justify the removal of asylum seekers 
from the sending State. This, of course, frees the State from the financial and socio-
political implications of receiving the removed applicants.  
The ‘third safe country’ concept constitutes a second measure of insulation 
against the burdens of refugees for developed States. Based on a narrow, antithetical 
interpretation of Article 31 (1) of the 1951 Convention, an asylum seeker may be 
penalised for illegally entering a State, unless she is ‘coming directly from a territory 
where [her] life or freedom was threatened.’ This position, often taken by States in 
																																																						
76 ‘… Particular States have legal obligations only toward refugees who are within the sphere of their 
formal or de facto jurisdiction.’ See Hathaway & Neve op cit (n33) 119. 
77 Ibid at 120. 
78 At the time of drafting of the 1951 Convention, there was a strong alignment of interests between 
labour-hungry post-war States and refugees. For a detailed description of the interest-convergence, 
see Ibid at 119 note 7. 
79 Ibid at 119. 
80 A term first coined by James C Hathaway in ‘The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée’ (1992) 
Refugees, Vol. 91 at 40-41, suggesting that ‘whereas refugee law is predicated on the duty of non-
refoulement … the politics of non-entrée is based on a commitment to ensuring that refugees shall 
not be allowed to arrive.’ 
81 Hathaway & Neve op cit (n33) 120. 
82 Goodwin-Gil & McAdam op cit (n20) 392. 
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favour of the concept, is among legal experts considered to be contradictive to both 
the wording and purpose of the Article — which is to protect refugees from 
penalisation ‘whatever their legal status upon entry.’83 Nonetheless, consensus 
remains among scholars, that international law permits the return of asylum seekers to 
third countries that both accept the responsibility for determining the applicant’s 
status, and produce ‘substantive and procedural human rights guarantees.’84 
This chapter principally argues that while legal, the ‘third safe country’ notion 
is a precarious concept designed to distribute responsibilities for refugees, but often 
used to avoid the burdens that comes with receiving refugees. This measure of 
avoidance may, in turn, easily lead to the refoulement of refugees.  
This chapter consists of five subsections. The following section will outline 
the requirements which must be met for the application of the third safe country 
concept to be legal under international law. The third section will examine the practice 
of the concept within the EU. The fourth section examines the European practice of 
the concept in relation to non-EU countries, before applying the observations of 
section two and three to the recent and topical readmission agreement between the EU 
and Turkey. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the observations of the chapter.  
 
II INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE APPLICATION 
OF THE ‘SAFE THIRD COUNTRY’ CONCEPT 
The UNHCR has long been critical of ‘safe third country’ practices, and the looming 
threat of refoulement such policies represent. The organisation launched an expert 
committee in 2002, articulating a non-exhaustive list detailing the necessary minimum 
requirements for the protection offered by the receiving State to be deemed ‘effective’, 
which must be met for the removal to be in accordance with international law.85 As 
the fundamental condition for the legality of the ‘third safe country’ concept, the 
committee stressed that ‘the question of whether a particular third country is safe for 
the purpose of returning an asylum-seeker is not a generic question, which can be 
																																																						
83 Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove ‘The Safe Country Notion in International Law’ (1996) 9 
HarvHumRtsJ 185-228 at 190. See also Cathryn Costello ‘The Asylum Procedures Directive and 
the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices’ (2005) 7 EJIL 35-69 at 40. 
84 Goodwin-Gil & McAdam op cit (n20) 395. 
85 Amnesty International Canada & Canadian Council for Refugees ‘Contesting the Designation of 
the US as a Safe Third Country’ (2017) at 9, available at ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/stca-
submission-2017.pdf, accessed on 2 August 2017. 
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answered for any asylum-seeker in any circumstances.’86 Thus, an individual 
assessment of the applicant’s safety in the receiving country is of utmost importance.  
According to the expert committee, the ‘respect for human rights, the lack of 
real risk of deportation to another State where effective protection is unavailable, the 
existence of fair and efficient refugee determination procedures, the provision of 
sufficient means of subsistence, and the taking into account of “special vulnerabilities 
of the party concerned” and maintenance of the “privacy interests of the person and 
his or her family”’ all constitute minimum requirements for a State to be labelled safe 
enough for a transfer to be in step with international law.87 As noted by Goodwin-Gil, 
such ‘effective protection’, may be hindered by restrictions on asylum seekers’ access 
to formal procedures in the receiving State. He resolves that in order to mitigate these 
concerns, the receiving State should guarantee a 
willingness to readmit asylum seekers, acceptance of responsibility to determine 
claims to refugee status, notwithstanding departure from the country in question or 
the circumstances of initial entry, the treatment of applicants during the determination 
process in accordance with generally accepted standards, and some provision with 
respect to subsistence and human dignity issues, such as social assistance or access to 
the labour market in the interim, family unity, education of children and so forth.88  
This section has established the international requirements for readmissions to ‘safe 
third countries’ to be considered legal under international law. As will be shown in the 
following section, these requirements have mostly been adhered to in decisions of 
European supranational courts. 
 
III EUROPEAN ‘SAFE THIRD COUNTRIES’ PRACTICES 
The practice of ‘safe third country’ policies originated in Europe,89 for the purpose of 
combating various issues arising from the abolition of the internal borders of the 
Schengen area. This allowed for persons, including asylum seekers, to move easily 
between the member States of the Schengen agreement.90 The abolition of border 
controls led to disputes among member States, over which State was responsible for 
																																																						
86 Emily Carasco ‘Canada-United States “Safe Third Country” Agreement: To What Purpose?’ (2003) 
41 ACDI 305-342 at 313. 
87 Amnesty International Canada & Canadian Council for Refugees op cit (n85) 9. 
88 Goodwin-Gil & McAdam op cit (n20) 396. 
89 Carasco op cit (n86) 308. 
90 Jason Mitchell ‘The Dublin Regulation and Systemic Flaws’ (2016-2017) 18 SDILJ 295-324 at 
301. 
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the determination of individual asylum applications.91 The Dublin Convention of 
199092 sought to put an end to such disputes, while preventing both ‘delayed access to 
protection for an asylum seeker if no Member State claimed responsibility’; as well as 
‘asylum seekers from choosing a Member State they perceived as most favourable,’93 
a phenomenon commonly referred to as asylum shopping. 
The Convention was replaced by the Dublin Regulation in 2003,94 and the 
second revision of the Regulation came into effect in January 2014.95 This regulation 
(Dublin III) requires member States to ‘examine any application for international 
protection by a third-country national or stateless person who applies on the territory 
of any one of them, including at the border or in the transit zones.’96 The asylum 
application is to be examined by a single member State, as determined per chapter 3 
of the Dublin III. Chapter 3 establishes a clear hierarchy of nexuses, where family 
connections are given priority.97 However, if the applicant has no such connections, 
the responsibility to determine the application falls to the first member State to which 
the applicant entered.98 
Importantly for the protection of refugees, the Dublin III establishes various 
safeguards. Chief among them, is the prohibition of transferring an applicant if there 
are ‘substantial grounds for believing’ that the asylum procedures or reception 
conditions of the receiving State suffer from ‘systemic flaws.’99 The sending State is 
to be responsible for determining the applicant’s claim if these flaws constitute a ‘risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment,’ as provisioned by Article 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union100 (CFREU). As Article 4 of the CFREU 
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is identical to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the 
subjection of an applicant to ‘torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ would necessarily constitute a ‘systematic flaw’ under Dublin III.101 
A systemic flaw was illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), in the landmark case of M.S.S v Belgium and Greece. The case concerned 
an Afghan asylum seeker who first entered Europe through Greece before he reached 
Belgium, where he applied for asylum.102 In accordance with the Dublin 
Regulation,103 the applicant was readmitted to Greece.104 Subsequently he was 
detained, in squalid conditions, and upon release he was forced (given his 
impoverished state) to live on the streets of Athens. 
The court recalled its previous judgment S.D. v Greece,105 in which the 
confinement of an asylum seeker in ‘a prefabricated cabin for two months without 
allowing him outdoors or to make a telephone call, and with no clean sheets and 
insufficient hygiene products, amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3’106 of the ECHR. The court thus concluded that a six-day detainment, in a 
confined spaced without the access to walks, leisure or free access to toilets was 
‘unacceptable with respect to Article 3’ of said convention.107  
Furthermore, the court held that Greek authorities were obliged to uphold 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, including the ‘obligation to 
provide accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum 
seekers.’108 The court found his protracted, humiliating and desperate situation to 
constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. While the court found Belgium to be 
in violation of the same article due to its lacking verification of the dysfunctional 
Greek procedural practices of which ‘Belgian authorities knew or ought to have 
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known,’109 both countries were found to have violated the applicants’ right to effective 
remedy.110  
As the highest court within European Union law, the ECJ referenced M.S.S v 
Greece and Belgium in its subsequent joined decisions of N.S. v Secretary of State and 
M.E. v Refugee Applications Commissioner.111 The court ruled that ‘European Union 
law precludes the application of a conclusive presumption’ that the responsible 
member State under the Dublin Regulation observes ‘the fundamental rights of the 
European Union.’112 The two judgments are generally recognised to have established 
a duty with removing States to individually ascertain that applicants only are 
transferred to member States which asylum procedures does not suffer from 
‘systematic deficiencies.’113  
In the wake of these decisions, Greece’s asylum system was considered 
systemically flawed, to the extent that all readmissions to the country came to a halt. 
In practice, this shifted the responsibility for determination processes to the would-be 
removing States.114 
 
IV THE EUROPEAN APPLICATION OF THE ‘THIRD SAFE 
COUNTRY’ NOTION OUTSIDE OF THE EU 
The Intra-European system for designating responsibility for asylum seekers, 
regulated through the Dublin Convention and the later Regulations as described above, 
was built on the assumption that asylum seekers would receive equal access to asylum 
procedures and protection in all member States.115  
However, both the EU and individual member States pursue the avoidance of 
responsibility for determining asylum claims by way of transferring applicants to 
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‘third safe countries’ outside the EU.116 This is done through readmission agreements. 
The European Migration Network has defined readmission agreements as 
[agreements] between the EU and/or a Member State with a third country, on the basis 
of reciprocity, establishing rapid and effective procedures for the identification and 
safe and orderly return of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for 
entry to, presence in, or residence on the territories of the third country or one of the 
Member States of the European Union, and to facilitate the transit of such persons in 
a spirit of cooperation.117 
Although removal is not automatic, the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD)118 allows 
for the sending EU State to ‘consider an application for international protection as 
inadmissible’ if ‘a country which is not a Member State is considered as a safe third 
country for the applicant, pursuant to Article 38.’119 If a country which the applicant 
transited through is labelled ‘safe’ in accordance with Article 38, her asylum 
application will not be determined on its merits, unless she can convince the relevant 
authority that her return will be unsafe.120 
The APD121 constitutes the legal instrument regulating whether an applicant 
can be removed to a ‘safe third country’ by a EU State,122 and Article 38 of the 
directive establishes a series of principles of which ‘the competent authorities [of the 
removing State must be] satisfied that a person seeking international protection will 
be treated in accordance with’ in the relevant third country: 
a) Life and liberty of the applicant must not be threatened on grounds of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.  
b) There must be no risk of serious harm as defined in Article 15 of Directive 
2011/95/EU. 
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c) The principle of non-refoulement as provided for in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
must be respected by the receiving State.  
d) The receiving State prohibits removal of persons in violation of the right to freedom 
from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
e) Asylum procedures allowing for the applicant to request asylum and refugee status, 
affording the applicant protection as per the 1951 Convention if refugee status is 
granted.  
As established by the ECJ judgment noted in section III, it does not suffice that the 
receiving State has ratified the relevant instruments, as the principles above must be 
upheld and actively applied by the receiving State.123 In addition to prescribing that 
the receiving State respects basic human rights and established principles of 
international refugee law, the provision requires implementation of national 
legislation on part of the removing State. This legislation must require the 
establishment of ‘a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned,’ 
in addition to rules determining the methodology to be used in the verifying of whether 
a third safe country is truly safe.124 These rules must allow for the  
individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular 
applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application 
of the safe third country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in 
his or her particular circumstances.125  
Accordingly, the procedure must allow for the asylum seeker to appeal the application 
of the third safe country concept, based on her individual situation.  
The APD also prescribes that asylum seekers must be ensured access to ‘an 
effective remedy before a court or a tribunal, against’ the consideration of ‘an 
application to be inadmissible,’ as a consequence of the application of the ‘third safe 
country’ notion.126 Accordingly, the APD establishes rules ensuring that the European 
practices of ‘safe third country’ policies are in accordance with the minimum 
requirements set by international law, as outlined above in section II. 
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This section has described the necessary requirements for a transfer of an 
applicant to a non-EU State to be legal under EU law. The ‘third safe country’ notion 
was originally purposed to effectively settle questions of responsibility. However, the 
concept does also serve as a tool for shirking responsibility for the burdens of refugees, 
burdens that would often befall the sending States, had the 1951 Convention been 
applied sincerely and without use of the concept. In the following, the requirements 
outlined in this section will be applied to the pertinent readmission agreement between 
the EU and Turkey. 
(i) Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ 
In 2016, the EU entered into an agreement with Turkey for the purpose of preventing 
further influxes of asylum seekers from Turkey to European territories.127 As the 
agreement was entered into by sovereign entities, it can be assumed that the terms 
agreed upon were regarded as mutually beneficial by the parties involved. While the 
agreement, on the State-level seek to distribute and determine responsibilities for 
refugees, it will in the following be shown how this particular agreement of burden-
sharing is severely detrimental for asylum seekers and refugees. 
According to the Joint Action Plan, Turkey shall restrict irregular movements 
from its territory to the EU as well as ‘readmit from the EU all irregular migrants who 
had transited through Turkey.’128 The scope of the agreement was recently expanded 
to include asylum seekers whose applications were ‘found to be inadmissible’ by 
European States.129  
The legality of the transfer of asylum seekers to Turkey from the EU is, under 
EU law, regulated by the APD. For the readmission of an asylum seeker not to 
constitute a violation of the 1951 Convention, it must be ascertained by the removing 
State, or by the EU, that the individual applicant will be protected in Turkey from 
further refoulement leading to persecution.  
As prescribed by APD Article 38 (1) (e), the third country to which an 
applicant is being transferred to must offer asylum procedures which, if refugee status 
is granted, entails the rights pursuant to the 1951 Convention. However, Turkey has 
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made a reservation to its ratification of the 1967 Protocol, geographically limiting the 
definition of who can be considered a refugee to the one of the original 1951 
Convention. Consequently, Turkey only applies the 1951 Convention, and only grants 
the rights therein, to ‘persons who have become refugees as a result of events 
occurring in Europe…’130 (Emphasis added.) 
Turkey recast its national regulation of the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 4 April 2013. As of 
Article 61 and 62 of the regulation, refugee status is reserved for European applicants, 
while non-European, and in light of current events, particularly Syrian asylum seekers 
may only be granted ‘conditional refugee status,’ a status which merely allows them 
‘to reside in Turkey until they are resettled to a third country.'131 Therefore, the 
protection of ‘conditional refugees’ fall outside Turkey's application of the 1951 
Convention, and the rights granted to non-European refugees fall short of that 
stipulated by the 1951 Convention. As of these limitations, ‘no possibility exists’ for 
non-European asylum seekers readmitted to Turkey ‘to receive protection in 
accordance’ with the 1951 Convention.132 Consequently, any EU member State which 
removes a non-European applicant to Turkey under the ‘safe third country’ concept 
will be violating the APD. Additionally, Turkey’s discriminate application of the 1951 
Convention is at odds with the requirement of fair determination procedures,133 and 
the removal may therefore also constitute a violation of international law.  
Essential to the designation of Turkey as a ‘third safe country’ under both 
international and the APD, is the country’s upholding and respect for the principle of 
non-refoulement. While Turkey is bound by the principle as a rule of customary 
international law,134 the Turkish national legislation only prohibits the ‘return’ of 
asylum seekers,135 leaving the country’s observance of the obligation of non-rejection 
from its borders uncertain. While there are consistent reports and allegations of 
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systematic breaches of the principle of non-refoulement commissioned by Turkey,136 
the establishment of such facts is outside the scope of this research. Granted that the 
reports are correct, however, a designation of Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ and a 
return of asylum seekers from a EU State to Turkey would constitute a violation of the 
APD Article 38 (c), as well as of the principle of non-refoulement as a rule of 
customary international law. 
This section has explored some of the serious concerns related to the 
readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey, and illustrates how the ‘third safe 
country’ notion is applied in order to avoid responsibilities and burdens related to the 
reception of asylum seekers. Evidently, the EU has entered into an agreement which 
ultimately violates the legal requirements for ‘third safe country’ removals which the 
EU itself has enacted.  
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in this chapter, the ‘safe third country’ concept constitutes yet another 
sophisticated method for avoiding responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees, 
implemented on several continents by developed countries for the purpose of reducing 
their share of the burden of refugees and asylum seekers. Although the concept have 
found acceptance in international law, the legitimacy of the individual transfer relies 
on the receiving States' respect for both international human rights and refugee law. 
Importantly, all removing States are under international law responsible for 
ascertaining that the applicant will not suffer from refoulement as a result of the 
transfer. Additionally, removing EU States are required by the APD to ascertain that 
the human rights of the applicant will be respected in the third country, and that the 
applicant will be granted access to a formal asylum procedure of which a positive 
determination will grant the applicant the rights entailed by the 1951 Convention. 
As shown in this chapter, the Dublin system has established legal obligations 
for the EU member States to ensure the protection of asylum seekers, and that they 
receive a fair and formal determination of their applications. However, as illustrated 
by the decisions of the ECtHR and the ECJ, the asylum procedures of some member 
States are not adequately handling the pressure of recent mass-arrivals, increasing the 
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importance of the removing State's ascertaining of the aptitude of the asylum 
procedures of the receiving State, before effectuating a transfer.  
Finally, the ‘safe third country’ agreement made to keep asylum seekers at bay 
between the EU and Turkey, has been shown to pose a serious threat to the principle 
of non-refoulement. As shown in this chapter, there is ample evidence that the 
assumption that Turkey is indeed a safe country for asylum seeker, could render the 
removing countries responsible for both direct and indirect refoulement. The concept, 
and this chapter, illustrate how States implement policies which often conflicts with 
their obligations under international refugee law, in order to avoid the burdens of 
refugees. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM 
STATES AND THE UNHCR TO CLAIM COMPENSATION 
FROM REFUGEE-GENERATING STATES  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The current refugee regime leaves the economic burdens of caring for the millions of 
refugees worldwide with the refugees themselves, with asylum States, and with 
international relief organisations like the UNHCR. The possibility of holding the State 
which is responsible for the creation of refugees to the financial cost of their protection 
is alluring, and a proposition which legal merits will be explored and examined in this 
chapter. 
An escape from persecution typically leaves the refugee with little material 
assets other than what she is able to bring with her. Therefore, the need for the asylum 
State or relevant relief organisations to provide care and assistance by means of 
shelter, food and clothing is often imperative for the survival of the persecuted person. 
Accordingly, the persecution which necessitates this protection and assistance lead to 
financial burdens for all parties involved, except for the party responsible for 
generating these burdens.  
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The questions of fiscal responsibility for the creation of refugees and the 
entailing compensation can be posed with several claimants. The primary loss is borne 
by the individual refugee herself, as properties belonging to her which have been 
seized, destroyed, or which she simply had to leave behind due to the threat of 
persecution, constitute a financial loss on her part.  
This chapter will principally argue that there are ways in which individual 
refugees, asylum States and the UNHCR may seek compensation for expenditure 
relating to the care of refugees, from the State responsible for their creation. This 
chapter will examine whether a refugee can claim compensation from a country of 
origin for losses inflicted by the State as a result of direct or indirect persecution, and 
how. 
In the case of a mass influx of asylum seekers,137 the asylum State must meet 
the basic needs of all refugees present in its territory, which demands the allocation of 
large sums of money.138 This chapter will examine the judicial measures that are 
available to the receiving State, when seeking compensation from the refugee-
generating State for these expenses.   
Finally, the legal rights and possibilities of the United Nations, specifically the 
UNHCR, to seek compensation from refugee-generating States for expenditure 
relating to relief rendered to refugees will be examined. The chapter will primarily 
explore the options of redress through judicial claims before the ICJ. 
This chapter consists of nine subsections. In the following section, the concept 
of State sovereignty will be outlined, as a backdrop to the concept of State 
responsibility, which will be explored in the third section. Section four will establish 
the act of creating refugees as an internationally wrongful act. Section five will 
establish the legal right of individual refugees to compensation, while section six will 
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explore the legal measures available to refugees in seeking redress from the refugee-
generating State. Section seven will argue the right of asylum States to compensation 
while illustrating this right with a pertinent example. Section eight will explore some 
of the complaint mechanisms available to States, while section nine will establish the 
right of the UNHCR to compensation. The tenth and final section will present the 
conclusions of this chapter. 
 
II SOVEREIGNTY 
The core concept of international law is the sovereignty of States, and the primary 
subjects of international law are States.139 Thus, a discussion on the obligation of 
States to provide compensation for damages would be incomplete if this basic 
principle of international law was left untouched. As proclaimed by Article 2 of its 
Charter, the United Nations is ‘… based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members.’ The Declaration on Friendly Relations,140 expands on the content of 
sovereign equality:  
[A]ll States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal 
members of the international community ... In particular, sovereign equality includes 
the following elements...  
(b) each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;  
(c) each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;  
(d) the territorial integrity ... of the State [is] inviolable...  
(f) each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international 
obligations and to live in peace with other States.141 
The domestic aspect of full sovereignty affords the State the right to exclusive 
jurisdiction over its territories, free from the interference of other States.142 
Sovereignty in international law includes the ‘competence, immunity, or power, and 
in particular … the power to make autonomous choices,’143 thus allowing States to 
bind future behaviour through the ratification of international obligations. Arguably, 
sovereignty exists as a residual power that allows States behavioural freedom, yet only 
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in lieu of commitments to which the contracting States have consented.144 While the 
freedom of States outside of international treaties is less than absolute considering the 
growing number of international legal obligations not founded on explicit consent, a 
discussion of these limits is outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the principle of sovereignty allows States to enter into agreements with one 
another, as well as exercise jurisdiction within their own territory, free from outside 
intervention. This freedom from intervention, in turn, limits the powers of States, as 
the principle of equal sovereignty levies all States with ‘… a duty of non-intervention 
in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other States.’145  
In this section, the concept of State sovereignty has been outlined. The 
following section will explore the concept of State responsibility. 
 
III STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
All States have a fundamental obligation towards their citizens in securing them the 
protection and enjoyment of human rights, and a breach of these obligations would 
render the State liable under international law.146 Similarly, States incur responsibility 
for their actions and omissions resulting in damage to other States.  
The maxim first stipulated by Grotius in 1646 that ‘fault creates the obligation 
to make good the loss’147 suffered by an injured party, applies equally well in 
international and municipal law, and it is generally recognised that a wrongful act 
obligates the offender to make reparations.148 It is a widespread and logically coherent 
notion, that the lack of an obligation to restitute wrongs would effectively remove the 
duty to observe international obligations.149  
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) presented the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,150 (ILC Articles) a 
document which — while is not in itself formally binding — restates rules of 
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customary international law.151 This is illustrated by the prolific referral by 
international bodies to the ILC Articles since their publication,152 giving the Articles 
significant legal authority. 
For State liability to incur, the rules of responsibility require that a wrongful 
act attributable to the State has been committed through action or omission, and that 
the commissioning ‘constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’153 
As held by the UN Secretary-General in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration,  
The general principles of International Law concerning State responsibility are 
equally applicable in the case of breach of treaty obligation, since in the international 
field there is no distinction between contractual and tortious responsibility, so that the 
violation of a State of any obligation, of whatever origin gives rise to State 
responsibility…154  
Accordingly, it is clear that violations of both treaty obligations and obligations of 
customary international law, entail liability for the commissioning State. The action 
imputable to the State may be both direct and indirect. As noted by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in the case of Rodriguez-Velasquez v Honduras:  
[A]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State ... can lead to international, responsibility of the State, not because 
of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to 
respond to it as required by the Convention.155 
As one observer notes, indirect persecution attributable to the State may follow from 
the tolerance of ‘actions of unofficial persecutors [where the State] fails to provide 
their targets with the protection to which citizens or legally established foreign 
residents of law-abiding States are normally entitled.’156 However, the intricacies of 
establishing such indirect coercion are outside the scope of this paper.  
As established in this section, indirect and direct acts may render a State liable 
to pay restitution or compensation. The following section will establish the creation 
of refugees as an internationally wrongful act.  
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IV THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF CREATING 
REFUGEES 
Both direct and indirect creation of refugees by a State through persecution constitute 
a breach of international law, as such acts effectively violate any right of the individual 
that depends on the person's ability to live in her country of origin.157 This position 
has explicit support in the Declaration of Principles of International Law on 
Compensation to Refugees (DPILCR).158 All rights stipulated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stem from the basic right to live in one’s 
country, making the creation of a refugee indeed a violation of the entire UDHR.159 
Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides, as a legally binding document, the ‘right to liberty of movement and freedom 
to choose … residence’ to everyone lawfully within the territory of a State.160 As 
persecution (as substantiated by the 1951 Convention, Article 1 (A) (2)) in itself is an 
arbitrary act, refugees are arbitrarily denied the right to liberty of movement and 
residence. This leaves the State responsible for the persecution in violation of Article 
12 of the ICCPR.   
On the regional level, Protocol 1 Article 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights161 (ECHR), accord citizens of the signatory States with the right to 
peacefully enjoy their possessions, while Article 8 of the ECHR stipulates the right to 
respect for one’s home. The Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man, Article VIII stipulates the right to ‘move about freely within’ one’s country of 
nationality, and the right ‘not to leave it except by his own will.’ Moreover, Article IX 
enshrines the ‘right to the inviolability of [the individuals] home.’ The African Charter 
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on Human and Peoples’ Rights Article 12 prescribes the right to freedom of 
movement, while Article 14 stipulates the right to property. Article 6 provides the right 
to personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest. Clearly, all of these regional 
protection mechanisms are violated where persecution occurs, in addition to the 
international instruments listed above. 
The UN Charter obligates all States to ensure the protection of human rights,162 
thus establishing a ‘legal duty for States to prevent as well as investigate and punish 
[human rights] violations, to restore violated rights, and to provide effective remedies 
to victims of violations.’163 Accordingly, States are legally obliged by the Charter to 
uphold the rights prescribed in both the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well as any regional 
instruments they may have conceded to. As of this, the act of forceful displacement 
clearly constitutes a breach of both the rights of the persecuted person under 
international and regional human rights law, as well as of the obligation to uphold 
rights as stipulated by the UN Charter.   
While treaty-based international law provides a range of rights which would 
be violated through the act of persecution, the legal source has its shortcoming in 
formalities, as treaties must be ratified by the relevant refugee-generating State for the 
State to be bound by its provisions. Customary international law however, applies 
universally without the explicit acceptance of the violating State. Importantly, States 
have no right to withdraw from rules of customary international law, and particularly 
not from customary law that protect human rights.164 
On the intra-State level, persecutory acts and omissions leading to the 
displacement of persons beyond the borders of their home State, invariably results in 
financial burdens for the receiving State. While the reception of a single refugee would 
not result in unbearable financial costs, a mass influx of asylum seekers can severely 
alter the ability of the asylum State to provide services for its own citizens.165 As 
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receiving States are obligated to at a minimum provide shelter, food, clothing and 
basic education,166 the arrival of thousands of refugees entails significant financial 
burdens for the receiving State.167  
As early as 1891, US President Benjamin Harrison aptly declared that ‘a decree 
to leave one country is, in the nature of things, an order to enter another – some 
other.’168 The act of expulsion is inevitably inflicting financial damage on the asylum 
State, a wrongful act under customary international law, but it does also constitute an 
infringement of the ‘inviolable’ right of the asylum State to its territorial integrity.169  
The position that irregular entry represents a violation of the territorial integrity 
of States is supported by the restrictive policies implemented by States to combat 
large-scale influxes of asylum seekers and refugees,170 policies which are in turn 
illustrative of European States’ perception of asylum seekers as a threat to both 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.171 
As of the above, it is clear that the creation of refugees is a wrongful act of 
international character. This is due to the violation of international human rights, 
directly against the refugee herself, and to the violation of customary international 
law, violating the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the asylum State.  
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In this section, the direct or indirect act of persecution has been established as 
being internationally wrongful. The following section will establish the rights of the 
individual refugee to compensation. 
 
V THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL REFUGEE TO 
COMPENSATION 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, 
states that ‘compensation should be paid for the property of those [refugees] choosing 
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible…’ The Resolution also established the Conciliation Commission, with the 
objective to facilitate the payment of compensations to Palestinian refugees. Luke Lee 
maintains that the wording of the Resolution, in that compensation shall be made in 
accordance with ‘… principles of international law or in equity,’ must be interpreted 
as a reference to a pre-existing rule of international law.172 Even without this 
argument, there is a strong case to be made for the right of refugees to compensation 
as a rule of customary international law. The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as ‘a general practice accepted as 
law,’173 which the court repeatedly has defined as a ‘settled practice’ observed by 
States in combination with ‘opinio juris.’174  
While GA Resolutions generally are legally non-binding, scholars agree that 
the ‘repeated affirmation of a resolution by unanimous or overwhelming majorities of 
the General Assembly endows [the resolution] with an acquired legal character, 
particularly when it reflects the parallel development of state practice on the issue,’175 
thus painting GA Resolution as evidence of opinio juris. The notion that responsible 
Governments are obliged to compensate refugees for their loss of property has been 
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reaffirmed with both great consistency and widespread acceptance in a high number 
of GA resolutions.176 
Moreover, the ICCPR guarantees both a right to remedy177 while it demands 
that victims of injustices ‘shall be compensated according to law.’178 The collective 
weight of the recurring and near unanimously passed GA Resolutions, coupled with 
regional conventions enshrining the right to compensation for human rights that are 
violated through persecution, as well as the conclusion of the ICCPR as a binding 
treaty, confirm the principle of compensation in international law, and paint the right 
of refugees to compensation as a rule of international law.179 
In 1993, the International Law Association adopted the Declaration of 
Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees (DPILCR). While the 
principles are not legally binding, they are based on the numerous GA Resolutions 
expressing the right of refugees to compensation as a principle of customary 
international law.180 Principle 1 of the Declaration stipulates that the primary 
responsibility to provide compensation rests with countries that ‘directly force their 
own citizens to flee and/or remain abroad as refugees.’ The principle includes the 
responsibility of ‘paying adequate compensation to refugees,’ regardless of the relief 
and support the refugee might receive by third States or international organisations. 
Principle 2 establishes the act of generating refugees as an internationally wrongful 
act, obligating the responsible State to ‘make good the wrong done.’  
 
(i) Regional legislation and practice affirming the right of individual refugees to 
compensation 
The American Convention on Human Rights181 (ACHR) provides a regional, legal 
right for refugees to compensation from their home States. Article 11 (2) protects 
nationals of member States from ‘arbitrary or abusive interference with [the citizen’s] 
private life, his family, his home …’ while Article 21 (1) enshrines the ‘right to the 
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use and enjoyment of property.’ Article 22 prescribes the freedom of movement. All 
of these rights are, as established above, effectively violated when State persecution 
leads to forced displacement. Furthermore, Article 64 of the ACHR stipulates that if 
the IACHR concludes that a violation of the rights of the Convention has taken place, 
it shall ‘rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right … that was 
violated’ while ‘… if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation 
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair 
compensation be paid to the injured party.’ 
In the 1989 case of Velasquez-Rodriguez v Honduras, the IACHR considered 
a case of disappearances of Honduran citizens under the ACHR. The court found 
Honduras responsible for the disappearances and maintained that  
Reparation for harm brought about by the violation of an international obligation 
consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the restoration of 
the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violence, and 
indemnification for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including emotional 
harm.182  
The case reflects the principle, as laid out above, that States which are found 
responsible for breaches of human rights, are liable to provide full restitution, and 
compensation where restitution is not possible.183 While the case did not specifically 
pertain to the situation of refugees, the general obligation of responsible States to 
provide restitution to victims of human rights violations applies to the situation of the 
refugee, as shown above. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right specifically guarantees the 
right to property184 and the right to freedom of movement and residence within one’s 
home State.185 Article 27 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Protocol) prescribes that the court, in the case where it finds ‘that there 
has been [a] violation of a human or peoples’ right, … shall make appropriate orders 
to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.’ 
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The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in a number of cases 
established the right of refugees to compensation for the loss of, or the denial of access 
to properties. In the 1996 decision of Loizidou v Turkey, a Cypriot national, Mrs. 
Loizidou, claimed satisfaction for the denial of access to her home in the district of 
Kyrenia, a deprivation she had suffered since the Turkish invasion of the island in 
1974. The court asserted that Mrs. Loizidou had ‘effectively lost all control over, as 
well as all possibilities to use and enjoy, her property,’186 and that the Turkish denial 
of her access to her properties constituted a breach of the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s property, as prescribed by Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights187 (ECHR).   
In 1998, the court decided on the question of just satisfaction, concluding that 
Mrs. Loizidou was still the legal owner of the properties in question and that 
compensation was to be awarded for her loss of access under then Article 50 (currently 
Article 41) of the ECHR, which provides that  
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other 
authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the 
obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party 
allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or 
measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the 
injured party. 
The court awarded compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages,188 
and Turkey eventually paid a compensation of €1.12M to Mrs. Loizidou.189  
In the 2003 ECtHR decision of Demades v Turkey, the court found that Turkey 
had violated the applicant’s right to respect for his home190 as the policies of the 
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus denied displaced persons from making use of, or 
visiting their houses and homes in North Cyprus.191 The court also concluded that 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 had been continuously violated by denying the applicant his 
entitlement to ‘peaceful enjoyment of his possessions,’ leaving Turkey with a 
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responsibility to provide the applicant with ‘just satisfaction’ as prescribed by Article 
41 of the ECHR. Furthermore, the court found that the applicant was entitled to ‘a 
measure of compensation in respect of losses directly related’ to the violation suffered 
though the denial of access to and control of his property,192 and awarded a total of 
€840,000 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages while emphasising that the 
applicant was still the sole legal owner of the properties in question.193  
The cases mentioned above clearly show how refugees have a right to 
compensation for properties seized, lost or destroyed under the ECHR. While the cases 
before the ECHR both concern situations of direct coercion commissioned by the 
Turkish government, the conclusion of the IACHR in the case of Velasquez-Rodriguez 
v Honduras show how indirect coercion can render a State liable to pay 
compensation.194 
As established in this section, the individual refugee has a legal claim to 
compensation for property lost as a result of persecution. The following section will 
explore the access of refugees to legal remedies which may help them attain such 
compensation. 
 
VI ACCESS TO LEGAL REMEDIES FOR INDIVIDUAL REFUGEES 
As the ICJ does not accept claims by individuals,195 refugees must seek redress 
through regional or national remedies. National remedies are, however, largely 
unavailable to refugees as they by definition196 have left their home country. 
Moreover, where the State acts as persecutor it is highly unlikely that a claim before 
its courts would be a viable option.  
The IACHR does not accept complaints from individuals, and would as such 
be unavailable to refugees seeking compensation for lost property,197 except for in 
cases where the home State of the applicant lodges an application against another 
member State. As the refugeehood stems from the commissions of the State of origin, 
this preclude out this mechanism of redress. As such, the ACHR does not effectively 
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protect the interest of refugees. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
does, however, accept complaints directly from individuals against States that have 
ratified the ACHR. While the decisions made by the Commission is only 
recommendatory, the Commission may in particular situations seize the court, which 
judgments are binding.198   
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights accept individual complaints 
as in accordance with the requirements set out in Article 34 (6) of the African Protocol. 
However, the Protocol requires that the respondent State has declared its acceptance 
of such individual complaints. Currently, only 24 African States have ratified the 
Protocol, and per 21 October 2011, only Ghana, Tanzania, Mali, Malawi and Burkina 
Faso have made the necessary declaration allowing for individual complaints.199  
As per Article 34 of the ECHR, ‘the Court may receive applications from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in 
the Convention or the Protocols,’ thus allowing displaced persons to seek 
compensation directly before the ECtHR. However, this opportunity only applies to 
applications against member States of the ECHR.  
This section has explored some of the legal remedies available to individual 
refugees. The following section will explore the right of asylum States to 
compensation.  
 
VII THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM STATES TO COMPENSATION 
Already in 1939, the British lawyer RY Jennings held that refugee generating States 
were under a legal obligation to compensate asylum States for their financial 
burdens.200 As established above under section IV, the act of creating refugees through 
the forced displacement of persons constitutes an international wrongful act, due to 
the financial and socio-political burdens this imposes on the receiving State. As 
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established under the abovementioned section, such acts require the commissioning 
State to make good on the wrong done through restitution or compensation.  
In the Chorzów Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) decided on the question of restitution for an expropriated German factory 
within Polish territory. The court held that reparation ‘must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and establish the situation which would, in 
all probability, have existed if the act had not been committed.’ The case illustrates 
how reparation is a natural legal consequence of international wrongful acts. However, 
the Chorzow case dealt with illegal expropriation in breach of a treaty, while the 
question of compensation for financial costs due to the reception of refugees is based 
on the wrongful act of violating the sovereign right to territorial integrity. 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration gives an example of State responsibility 
established due to the violation of the right to territorial integrity. In 1965, the USA 
successfully sued Canada for damages to land, crops, and trees in the State of 
Washington, caused by transboundary pollution produced by an ore-smelter located 
in British Columbia. The ICJ held that 
Under the principles of international law … no State has the right to use or permit the 
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory 
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 201 
The court found Canada responsible under international law for allowing the fumes to 
cross into the USA, thus creating damages to US territory without its necessary 
consent. While fumes and refugees are essentially different, the general principle that 
no State may use its territory to the detriment of the rights of other States can be 
distilled from the decision.202 This principle is applicable to the situation where a State 
trough action or omission forces its nationals to cross into the territory of another State, 
thus imposing financial damages on the receiving State without its consent.203  
A State involved both directly and indirectly in the creation of refugees through 
persecution is, as established above, responsible for the violation of the sovereign 
equality of the receiving State. This is due to the interference a mass influx of asylum 
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seekers represents to the sovereign right of the receiving State ‘to decide whom they 
choose to admit to their territories.’204 The infringement on the receiving State’s right 
to sovereign control over its territory ‘constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the [generating] State’ not to interfere with another State’s right to 
territorial integrity.205  
As of the principle of non-refoulement, the State which receives asylum 
seekers to its frontiers is expressly forbidden under international law to turn such 
persons away, and is obliged to protect said persons from the expulsion to any territory 
in which persecution may occur.206 While it could be argued that the principle as 
codified in the 1951 Convention has been accepted by most States, and that receiving 
States indirectly has accepted the economic burdens of potential refugees, the principle 
is also a non-derogatory rule of customary international law.207 This makes the 
obligation to protect asylum seekers from refoulement mandatory for all States, 
regardless of their ratification of the 1951 Convention. The refugee-generating State's 
commissioning thus obligates the receiving State to take on a financial burden to 
which it has not consented.   
As established above in section IV, such a commission constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act, attributable to the refugee-generating State.  
 
(ii) Practical application of the observations 
Applied to the current affairs of the Syrian refugee crisis, the question of State 
Responsibility is of both great significance and interest. Turkey has spent more than 
€25bn on the refugee crisis so far,208 hosting the greatest number of refugees 
worldwide,209 of which the vast majority come from Syria. The conflict in Syria 
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erupted after the regime of Bashar Al-Assad responded violently against peaceful 
protests for reform, and it is clear that these actions were undertaken by State actors, 
loyal to the regime of Al-Assad. These actions are thus attributable to Syria. However, 
due to the complex composition and the abundance of armed factions, it is difficult to 
determinate whether the regime is the sole reason for the immense flows of Syrian 
asylum seekers entering Turkey at this point. Nonetheless, The Syrian Network for 
Human Rights reported that 73 per cent of the civilian deaths in Syria in 2015 were 
attributable to the regime,210 while a survey conducted in Germany revealed that 70 
per cent of the respondents fled Syria due to the actions of the regime.211 Furthermore, 
in resolution 2139 of 2014, the UN Security Council ‘strongly condemns the 
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the 
Syrian authorities.’212  
Given the indicators listed in the paragraph above, it is plausible that the Syrian 
regime is responsible for the main bulk of the atrocities committed against its 
population. As it is beyond the scope of this research to investigate and establish 
evidence of attribution, it is in the following argument presumed that the actions 
leading to the expulsions of Syrian citizens are in fact attributable to the Syrian regime 
of al-Assad. 
As a logical extension of this presumption, the regime would be responsible 
for the mass-influx of asylum seekers to Turkey, and thus also the for the resulting 
financial burdens imposed on Turkey. As stipulated by Article 36 of the ILC Articles, 
‘[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to 
compensate for the damage caused thereby…’ and the Syrian regime is thus obliged 
under the rules of State responsibility to compensate Turkey for the expenses the 
country has had in aiding Syrian refugees. As noted by the PCIJ in the Chorzów 
Factory Case, reparation ‘must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and establish the situation which would probably have existed if the act 
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had not been committed,’213 illustrating the obligation to make full restitution, or 
compensation for internationally wrongful acts. Article 31 of the ILC Articles 
maintains that ‘injury includes any damage, whether material or moral caused by the 
internationally wrongful act of a State,’ and it is thus clear that Turkey has been injured 
as a result of Syrian actions. Turkey may thus invoke the liability of the Syrian regime 
to ‘make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’ in 
accordance with Article 31 of the ILC Articles. 
This section has established the legal right of asylum States under international 
law to compensation from refugee-creating States. The following section will explore 
some of the complaint mechanisms available to States seeking such compensation. 
 
VIII ACCESS TO COMPLAINT MECHANISMS FOR STATES 
As of Article 35 of the ICJ Statute, all State parties have access to the court, which 
jurisdiction ‘comprises all cases which the parties refer to it…’ However, an 
acceptance of jurisdiction is necessary for the court to have the jurisdiction to bind 
sovereign States in its decisions. Continuing the hypothetical case of Syria v Turkey 
as above in section VII, Syria has not given a compulsory declaration of jurisdiction 
to the ICJ,214 and a case lodged by Turkey against Syria before the court would be 
deemed inadmissible. 
Granted that the ICJ has jurisdiction based on declarations from the parties to 
the dispute,215 it follows from Article 36 (2) (d) of the ICJ Statute that the court would 
have the material jurisdiction to decide on the extent of reparations, following of a 
breach of an international obligation. Furthermore, the court would have the 
competence to decide on cases applying ‘general principles of law recognised by 
civilized nations,’216 such as the principles of State responsibility.  
While the principle of sovereignty blocks the possibility of opening judicial 
procedures against Syria for such a claim before the ICJ,217 Syria’s lack of a 
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declaration to the ICJ does not preclude Turkey, or any State in a similar situation, 
from seeking other means of redress. Negotiations and voluntary arbitration are typical 
pacific methods of settling international claims, yet the probability of a refugee-
generating State agreeing to either of these methods is tantamount to non-existent. 
Turkey can, however, raise complaints through its representative with the UN General 
Assembly.  
While this section has explored some of the legal mechanisms available to 
States, the following section will examine the right of the UNHCR to claim and attain 
compensation. 
 
IX THE RIGHT OF THE UNHCR TO CLAIM COMPENSATION  
The UN, and specifically the UNHCR, operates on a budget mainly provided by donor 
States in its assisting and protection of refugees.218 The success of the UNHCR in 
attaining restitution for financial expenses resulting from acts commissioned by 
refugee-creating States would provide the organisation with a necessary, just and 
legitimate expansion of its budget. This would in turn benefit refugees aided by the 
organisation.  
The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, adopted in General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of December 14, 1950 
provides that ‘[t]he United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under 
the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing 
international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall 
within the scope of the present statute…’219 As argued by Luke Lee, the general and 
broad powers entrusted on the High Commissioner makes her the ‘guardian of the 
interests of refugees,’220 which in turn would enable the UNHCR to claim 
compensation on behalf of the refugees whose interests it represents. This position is 
substantiated by the DPILCR, which explicitly states that the UN ‘may, in the 
discharge of its role as guardian of the interests of refugees, claim and administer 
compensation funds for refugees.’221  
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After the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations,222 it is clear that the UN has the necessary legal personality to bring 
forth international claims, and to seek redress for damage suffered by agents of the 
Organisation. In the opinion, the court held it ‘clear that the Organization has the 
capacity to bring a claim for’ damages to the interests of which it is guardian.223 As 
increasing the financial clout of the UNHCR clearly is in the interest of refugees, the 
advisory opinion must be read as supportive of the enabling of the UN to seek 
compensation from refugee-creating States for financial losses inflicted on the 
UNHCR.  
The fact that the UN and its sub-organisations have the necessary legal 
personality to lodge international claims does, however, not allow the institution to 
bring such claims before the ICJ.224 Nonetheless, the UN possesses a global, non-legal 
enforcement power enabling it to seek compensation regardless of this shortcoming. 
Through resolutions and sanctions of the Security Council (UNSC), the UNHCR may 
attain compensation from refugee producing States. As of Article 39 of the Charter, 
the UNSC ‘shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression,’ allowing the Council to make decisions as to what 
measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Furthermore, Article 41 of the Charter grant the UNSC the power to ‘decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effects to its 
decisions’ made under Article 39, and it ‘may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures.’ Such a decision would be binding on all parties to 
the Charter.225 
The UNSC has already applied these provisions in order to secure funds to the 
benefit of refugees. In 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 778, deciding ‘that all 
States in which there are funds of the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, 
corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or 
petroleum products’ were to transfer these funds to an escrow account established by 
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the UNSC.226 Further, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to ‘ascertain the 
costs of United Nations activities concerning … the provision of humanitarian relief 
in Iraq …’227 and to use the funds that was not to be transferred to the Compensation 
Fund228 to cover ‘the costs of United Nations activities concerning the … provision of 
humanitarian relief in Iraq …’229 As of this precedent, it is clear that the UNSC has 
the power to compel nations worldwide to freeze relevant assets of the refugee-
creating State, and to implement them in a useful and constructive manner by 
strengthening the humanitarian operations of the UNHCR. This would, naturally, 
bolster the international protection of refugees, while simultaneously alleviating 
asylum States from some of their financial burdens.  
 
X CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in this chapter, rules of both regional and universal human rights law are 
violated when States persecute nationals. Furthermore, this chapter has established 
that the resulting expulsion of, or escape by the persecuted persons from the territory 
of the persecuting State results in a violation on the part of the generating State under 
international law, as transboundary forced displacement violates the territorial 
integrity of the receiving State. This violation makes the generating State liable, and 
thus responsible for the compensation for financial damages suffered by the receiving 
State. 
While the individual refugee can seek compensation through regional courts, 
only nationals of signatory States to the ECHR can file an application directly to a 
supra-national judicial organ that is able to give decisions which are legally binding 
on the generating State.  
Receiving States may invoke the responsibility of liable States and claim 
compensation through judicial proceedings before ICJ, provided that the injuring State 
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has given a declaratory jurisdiction to the court. There are nonetheless, as indicated, 
non-judicial methods which States can apply when seeking redress. 
Finally, the UNHCR has through the UN, as established by the Reparations of 
Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations, the competence to raise 
international claims of compensation for expenditure against the refugee-creating 
State.230 The UNCHR may also appeal to the UNSC to decide on a Charter Chapter 
VII resolution to freeze and draw compensation from the generating State’s assets.  
While the legal basis of the right to compensation is clear as to the legal 
instruments, the issues of enforcement constitute the greatest obstacle when 
considering a claim for compensation. Nonetheless, the possibility of claiming 
compensation from refugee-creating States is a welcome and morally justifiable claim, 
which could restore some of the judicial and economic imbalances that the lack of 
obligations and responsibility on part of States generating refugees through the 
violation of human rights and international law constitute. With improved access to 
judicial procedures and enforcement mechanisms, the rights enshrined in the various 
instruments examined in this chapter, could prove to form effective disincentives for 
States persecuting their citizens. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO 
RESCUE AND DETERMINE THE STATUS OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN DISTRESS AT SEA 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The arrival of asylum seekers by way of sea is certainly not a modern phenomenon, 
although the unprecedented numbers arriving on European shores might be. The year 
2015 saw more than a million migrants landing on European beaches and ports,231 and 
the plastic dinghies often utilised are neither of the size nor sturdiness required to 
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safely undertake journeys across rough seas.232 The death-toll of the Mediterranean 
Sea in recent years serves as a testimony to the danger that irregular sea-borne routes 
represent to the lives of the people who undertake them.233 
These perilous journeys, undertaken as a desperate measure in the quest for 
safety from persecution, make the obligations of States to effect rescue operations a 
particularly pertinent topic. With no universal framework for the fair distribution of 
responsibilities for refugees, the complex and contested issues of State responsibilities 
to process asylum applications in the wake of rescue- and interdiction operations are 
of equal relevance.   
This chapter will principally argue that coastal States are obliged to disembark 
asylum seekers rescued at sea, and to determine their refugee status. The chapter 
consists of seven subsections. The following section will discuss the duty of States to 
rescue asylum seekers at sea, while the third section will examine the obligation of 
coastal States to allow for the disembarkation of rescued asylum seekers. The fourth 
section will explore the principle of non-refoulement as a doorway to disembarkation 
and status determination processes, while the fifth section will offer a practical 
application of the observations made in this chapter. The sixth and final section will 
summarise the observations made.  
 
II THE DUTY TO RESCUE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN DISTRESS AT 
SEA 
The duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is an age-old rule of customary 
international law,234 and the principle is codified in, among other Conventions, the 
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1982 Convention on the International Law of the Sea235 (UNCLOS). Article 58 (2) 
and 98 (1). The latter provision stipulates that  
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so 
without serious danger to the ship, the crew, or the passengers … to render assistance 
to any person found at sea in danger of being lost … and to proceed with all possible 
speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so 
far as such action may be reasonably be expected of him. 
As per the ordinary meaning of the provision’s wording, it is clear that the flag State 
is under a positive legal obligation to have all ships flying its flag render assistance to 
anyone in such need, irrespective of the distressed individuals’ nationality or 
migratory status.236 The UNCLOS, as well as the International Convention on the 
Safety of Life at Sea237 (SOLAS) and the International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue238 (SAR) — all legally binding instruments — provide clear 
obligations to render assistance to all persons in distress at sea.239 Yet, this most 
fundamental rule protecting the safety of life at sea has, unfortunately, been broken in 
both the distant and recent past, vis-à-vis asylum seekers in distress at sea.  
Ordinary seafarers in distress who are rescued, repatriate without difficulty 
after they are disembarked from the rescuing vessel. Asylum seekers who, due to a 
fear of persecution are unwilling to repatriate, represent a burden which States, in lieu 
of clear rules for the international distribution and sharing of the burden of refugees 
are inclined to attempt to avoid, by the simple yet effective measure of denying 
disembarkation of the rescued asylum seekers. As negotiations for the disembarkation 
of asylum seekers often is a lengthy process,240 the delay causes disincentives for 
shipmasters and –owners to render assistance to asylum seekers and migrants in 
distress at sea, increasing the risk for loss of lives.  Two examples will illustrate the 
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additional layer of danger added to situations of distress at sea faced by asylum 
seekers.  
During the Indo-Chinese mass exodus in the late 1970s and -80s, boat people 
were fleeing the Vietnamese communist regime. The number of asylum seekers in 
refugee camps in the neighbouring coastal States steadily increased, while large 
vessels were chartered by smuggling syndicates to bring asylum seekers by the 
thousands per ship.241 This, in turn, spiked local hostility towards asylum seekers. The 
towing of vessels carrying asylum seekers back to the high seas became a measure 
increasingly utilised to avoid responsibility for additional asylum seekers,242 and 
commercial vessels were denied the disembarkation of rescued protection seekers. The 
delays incurred on the part of commercial vessels caused financial losses for ship-
owners, and in between September and October 1979, 80 to 90 per cent of commercial 
vessels in the region ignored emergency calls from vessels in distress.243  
Another, more recent illustration is the testimony of Abassi, a 21-year old 
Nigerian migrant who recounted to Human Rights Watch how he alongside 85 other 
people clung to an inflatable boat for five days in the Mediterranean, awaiting rescue. 
Both a helicopter and a ship passed them without rendering assistance of any kind, 
and three people died.244  
These unsettling examples arguably result from the lack of a clear obligation 
on coastal States to allow for disembarkation of rescued asylum seekers in 
international legal instruments, and are symptomatic of the lack of a burden-sharing 
system in international refugee law.  
As shown in this section, all vessels are obliged to aid asylum seekers in 
distress at sea. The following section will examine the obligation of coastal States to 
disembark rescued asylum seekers. 
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III THE OBLIGATION TO ALLOW DISEMBARKATION OF 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
As the very lives of migrants attempting to reach the shores of developed countries 
often depend on commercial and State vessels effecting rescue operations, it is self-
evident that clear rules which minimise incentives for shipmasters and –owners to act 
in contradiction to the obligation to rescue are imperative for the prevention of tragic 
and unnecessary loss of life.  
As the inadequacy of the legal framework on rescue at sea of asylum seekers 
was highlighted yet again in 2001 by the Tampa incident, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) called for a review of the existing legal instruments to eliminate 
gaps and inconsistencies.245 As a result, both the SOLAS and the SAR Conventions 
were amended in 2004.246 The SOLAS amendment obliges the signatory States to  
co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by 
embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum 
further deviation from the ship’s intended voyage, provided that releasing the master 
of the ship from the obligations under the current regulation does not further endanger 
the safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government responsible for the search and 
rescue region in which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary 
responsibility for ensuring that such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, so that 
survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of 
safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines 
developed by the Organization. In these cases, the relevant Contracting Governments 
shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably 
practicable.247 (Emphasis added.) 
As of the wording of this amendment, the disembarkation of rescued persons shall 
take place at the next port of call, a practice which constitutes the common procedure 
in cases of ordinary rescued persons.248 This effectively minimises delays and 
financial losses on the part of the rescuing vessel. This is, in turn, mutually beneficial 
to would-be rescuees, as the economic rationale for ignoring distress calls is 
minimised.   
Unfortunately, the amendment simply delegates ‘primary responsibility’ for 
the deliverance of rescued persons to a ‘place of safety,’ a wording which hardly 
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places a positive legal duty on the responsible SAR nation to allow for disembarkation 
in its own ports. While one can find some support for the notion that the responsible 
SAR nation is obligated to accept disembarkation in the IMO Facilitation Committee’s 
Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued 
at Sea, the wording does not carry the semblance of a positive legal obligation, but 
rather that of a mere recommendation. The Principles state that if ‘disembarkation 
from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government 
responsible for the Search and Rescue area should accept the disembarkation of the 
persons rescued.’249 In addition to the recommendatory nature of the wording, the 
Principles are themselves not legally binding.250 
As the disembarkation of rescued asylum seekers requires access to ports, the 
natural point of departure for an analysis of a duty to allow disembarkation would be 
the one of foreign ships’ access to the ports of coastal States. As ports are under the 
territorial sovereignty of the coastal State, the State has a right to regulate the entry of 
foreign ships,251 a position substantiated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
the case of Nicaragua v the United States of America.252  
It is, however, generally recognised as a rule of customary international law 
that vessels in distress, for humanitarian and safety reasons have ‘a right of entry to 
any foreign port.’253 As noted by Churchill and Lowe, ‘If a ship needs to enter a port 
or internal waters to shelter in order to preserve human life, international law gives it 
a right of entry.’254 According to the SAR Convention, a vessel is in distress when 
‘there is a reasonable certainty that a vessel or a person is threatened by grave and 
imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.’255 
As commercial vessels which have rescued tens or hundreds of people seldom 
are equipped or stocked for the nutritional and medical needs of people who might be 
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in dire need of medical attention, the entry to a port may quickly become imperative 
for the preservation of human life. Such a situation would thus override the principle 
of sovereignty, and allow the ship to seek refuge in any port.  
However, a coastal State attempting to avoid the reception of a rescuing vessel 
into its ports might seek to alleviate the factors creating the situation of distress on the 
rescuing vessel. In the Tampa incident, 438 persons had been rescued from a sinking 
fishing vessel, of which fifteen were unconscious, one child was sick, one person had 
suffered a broken leg and a great many people suffered ‘open sores and skin 
infections.’256 Clearly, many of the rescued persons aboard were in acute need of 
medical attention. Captain Rinnan of the Tampa saw no other option but to enter the 
Australian port of Christmas Island. Shortly after entering Australian territorial waters, 
the ship was boarded and seized by the Australian Special Air Services.257 Save for 
this interception by Australian military forces, the Tampa would, due to the ‘grave and 
imminent danger’ to the health and lives of the rescued persons aboard, be within its 
right according to customary international law in entering the port.  
However, this rule does not automatically settle the question of disembarkation 
of the asylum seekers on board the vessel. Neither does the rule touch on that of State 
responsibilities for determining the refugee status of persons on board the vessel.  
 
IV THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT AS A DOORWAY TO 
DISEMBARKATION AND DETERMINATION PROCEDURES 
The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the backbone of international refugee 
law, and is today recognised as a non-derogable rule of customary international law 
binding all States.258 Its primary wording is found in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, which stipulates that 
[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
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on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion. 
The application of the principle has traditionally been understood as being limited to 
the protection of refugees259 who find themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of 
a member State to the 1951 Convention. This is a consequence of the concept of 
jurisdiction under public international law traditionally having been ‘regarded as 
territorial in nature.’260 As the internal waters and territorial sea of a coastal State are 
within the sovereign jurisdiction of the coastal State,261 it is clear that a rejection from 
port which may lead to persecution is included within the prohibitory scope of the 
principle of non-refoulement. Such a conclusion must also be drawn from the broad 
wording of Article 33 (1) itself, which proscribes refoulement in ‘any manner 
whatsoever.’262 
The principle of non-refoulement as stipulated in Article 33 (1) does not 
contain any spatial restrictions. On the contrary, the provision prohibits any State 
action leading to refoulement ‘in any manner whatsoever.’ The broad wording clearly 
prohibits any form of expulsion from anywhere, strengthening the notion that the 
principle applies extraterritorially. A teleological interpretation of the Article provides 
further support; as the object of the principle is to protect refugees, the very purpose 
of the principle would be frustrated if it was to be fitted with geographical limitations.  
Moreover, the corresponding principle in the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), as well as the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies 
extraterritorially and must be respected by the coastal State in all its actions.263 As 
human rights instruments are to be interpreted in light of relevant societal and legal 
developments,264 the extraterritorial application of the principle as evidenced by the 
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later CAT and the ICCPR, ratified by the very States which have ratified the 1951 
Convention, lend interpretational support to the extraterritorial application of Article 
33 (1). Consequently, the principle of non-refoulement applies ‘anywhere that a State 
exercises jurisdiction over an asylum-seeker.’265 
While the US Supreme Court, in Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc.266 
sustained the interpretation of the US administration in that the principle only applies 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the USA, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights found the US' program of interdiction and return of asylum seekers 
without screening procedures to constitute a violation of both the principle of non-
refoulement under the 1951 Convention, and of the applicants’ right to life, liberty and 
security as stipulated by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.267 
The position held by the Commission reflects that of Goodwin-Gil and McAdam, in 
that the principle of non-refoulement applies to State action ‘wherever it takes place, 
whether internally, at the border, or through its agents outside territorial 
jurisdiction.’268 
Accordingly, the coastal State exercises territorial jurisdiction over asylum 
seekers on board distressed vessels that are seeking refuge within its ports. However, 
the State may also exercise personal jurisdiction over asylum seekers in both national 
and international waters.  
As established by the ICJ, a State exercises jurisdiction over and is legally 
responsible for actions which the State has ‘effective control’ over.269 When asylum 
seekers are rescued or interdicted by State actors, the action is attributable to the State. 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt about the control exercised by coast guard or navy 
members over asylum seekers interdicted or rescued from the sea being effective. 
Consequently, the applicants are under the jurisdiction of said State, a notion 
supported by the fact that the applicants in their escape from persecution are actively 
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attempting to submit themselves to a jurisdiction other than their own.270 The principle 
of non-refoulement thus applies both to applicants in port and to applicants interdicted 
or rescued by the coastal State. 
Once the principle of non-refoulement is activated due to the claimant being 
under the jurisdiction of a State while ‘outside the country of [her] nationality,’271 the 
State is obligated both by Article 33 (1) and by customary international law not to 
return her to a territory where persecution might ensue. The coastal State must 
ascertain that a rejection from port or a push-back will not result in refoulement, by in 
the very least assessing the individual applicant’s fear of persecution.  
As persecution is the essential defining element of refugeehood under the 1951 
Convention Article 1 (A) (2), the assessment of the applicant’s well-founded fear of 
persecution will in effect constitute an invariable part of the refugee determination 
process. Indeed, Alice Edwards notes that a conjunctive reading of Article 1 and 33 of 
the 1951 Convention obligates the State which exercises jurisdiction over the asylum 
seekers to grant claimants ‘at a minimum, access to asylum procedures for the purpose 
of refugee status determination.’272  
Further support for the notion that an individual assessment is required for the 
coastal State to avoid refoulement of asylum seekers can be found in Article 33 of the 
1951 Convention itself. While no derogation from the principle of non-refoulement is 
permitted, the second paragraph of the provision allows for exceptions where 
‘reasonable grounds for regarding [the asylum seeker] as a danger to the security of 
the country’ can be established, or in cases where the applicant has been ‘convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime.’273 Such exceptions can only be 
made based on individual assessment, establishing the potential disruptiveness of the 
individual applicant.274 
Moreover, the CAT obliges member States not to ‘expel, return ("refouler”) or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
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that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’275 The prohibition of 
refoulement to torture under CAT constitutes an expanding of the principle under the 
1951 Convention in that it permits no exceptions based on assessments of State 
security. Similarly, Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits the subjugation of anyone 
‘to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ is generally 
understood as to encompass and further the principle of non-refoulement.276 
A State party to any one of these Conventions would thus be obliged to 
ascertain that the rejection of any individual asylum seeker would not lead to 
persecution under the 1951 Convention, nor torture or inhuman treatment as 
prohibited by the CAT or the ICCPR.277 These assessments demand due processes, 
and the applicant must in accordance with Article 16 (1) of the 1951 Convention be 
given the right to appeal before a court should the decision be negative.278 
As a person is granted refugee status under the 1951 Convention because of 
her de facto circumstances,279 she must be assumed to be a refugee under Article 1 (A) 
(2) and accorded protection against refoulement until her claim is disproven by an 
official procedure.280 As the State in effective control of the asylum seeker must 
provide ‘access to official proceedings in order to verify her refugee status’281 — 
procedures which can only be completed on land282 — the State will by all practical 
means be obliged to allow disembarkation in order to fulfil its obligations under 
international law. Consequently, although the 1951 Convention can be said to suffer 
from the lack of an explicit obligation to determine the status of asylum seekers, such 
a duty is rendered implicit by the absolute prohibition of refoulement. In the European 
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context, this deduction is evidenced by the Schengen Border Code, which requires 
member States to implement entry controls ‘without prejudice to … the rights of 
refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-
refoulement.’283 In practice, the wording of the border code obliges contracting States 
to allow ‘temporary admission for the purpose of verifying the need for protection and 
the status of the person concerned.’284 
As established in this section, the principle of non-refoulement can oblige the 
coastal State to disembark rescued asylum seekers, and to determine their status as 
refugees. The observations of this section will in the following be applied to two 
historical situations. 
 
V PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE OBSERVATIONS 
The Tampa Incident 
On the 26 of August 2001, Norwegian cargo vessel M/V Tampa responded to a request 
from the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre to aid a sinking Indonesian fishing 
boat located some one hundred and forty kilometres from the Australian port of 
Christmas Island. The fishing boat held 438 persons headed for Australia to seek 
protection.285 Once the rescued persons were aboard the Tampa, licensed to carry a 
maximum of 50 people, captain Rinnan set for the next port of call, Singapore. The 
asylum seekers on board, however, feared persecution were they to be returned to 
Indonesia and threatened suicide if the captain persisted in bringing them there.286 The 
captain considered the situation on board to pose a significant risk of loss of life due 
to these threats,287 but also due to the general sanitary and medical situation aboard.288 
Moreover, Indonesia had not acceded to the 1951 Convention and indicated its 
unwillingness to receive the asylum applicants. Consequently, captain Rinnan 
disregarded Australian warnings of legal proceedings against him should he bring the 
asylum seekers to Australian waters, and sailed for Christmas Island. As a result, the 
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Tampa was boarded by 45 Australian soldiers and forced to leave the Australian 
territorial waters. After intense negotiations, New Zealand and Nauru offered to aid 
Australia in the disembarkation and processing of the asylum seekers.289  
As outlined above under section III, the Tampa was, due to the immediate risk 
to life aboard the vessel, within its right under customary international law to enter the 
port of Christmas Island. As of the boarding of the Tampa using armed soldiers, there 
is no doubt that Australia had ‘effective control’ over the asylum applicants, thus 
activating the prohibition of refoulement as per the 1951 Convention and customary 
international law. While Australia was not automatically obliged to disembark and 
process the asylum seekers, Australia was legally obliged to ascertain that the transfer 
of the applicants to New Zealand and Nauru would not pose a risk of persecution or 
further deportation to the asylum seekers. While it is beyond the scope of this research 
to establish a breach on the part of Australia regarding the principle of non-
refoulement, it is worth noting that Nauru at the time of receiving the applicants had 
legislation in place punishing homosexual activity with up to 14 years of imprisonment 
and hard labour.290 Thus, one of the countries which Australia transferred a portion of 
the applicants to, had legislation in place allowing for State persecution of 
homosexuals. Persecuted individuals of this particular social group are per definition 
refugees.291 As the asylum seekers at no time were consulted about the transfer to 
Nauru,292 Australian authorities had no way of ascertaining that none of the persons 
sent there did, in fact, belong to that particular social group. Australia was thus, 
through its transfer of the applicants to Nauru, potentially violating the principle of 
non-refoulement. 
 
ECtHR Case of Hirsi and Others v Italy 
In the 2012 case before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, about two hundred migrants 
were intercepted by the Italian State on the Mediterranean high seas. The occupants 
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of the intercepted vessels were transferred to Italian military ships and, despite 
protests, returned to Libyan authorities in Tripoli.293 
The court found that the applicants were ‘under the continuous and exclusive 
de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities,’ as they were taken aboard 
Italian-flagged military vessels.294 Moreover, the court unanimously concluded that 
Italy had violated the prohibition of torture, as well as that of inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.295 Furthermore, the court maintained that the principle of 
non-refoulement as per Article 33 of the 1951 Convention applied to both rescue 
operations and interdictions, as shown in this chapter.296 The court emphasised that it 
was Italy’s responsibility to ascertain that the return of the migrants to Libya would 
not result in a risk of treatment in violation of ECHR Article 3, both in Libya and 
through further deportation.297 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque made in his concurring opinion several 
noteworthy observations of relevance to the observations of this chapter. First, the 
judge asserted, alongside an unanimous court, that the principle of non-refoulement 
applies extraterritorially, and that the principle ‘can be triggered by a breach or the 
risk of a breach of the essence of any’ right under the ECHR.298 Moreover, the judge 
referenced both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the authors as 
mentioned above under section IV as examples of the extraterritorial application of 
the principle,299 before noting that the Australian and American courts’ interpretations 
of the principle is at variance with this position. The judge then expressly concluded 
that such interpretations ‘contradicts the literal and ordinary meaning of the language 
of Article 33’ and is thus simultaneously at variance with the VCLT, Article 1.300  
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V CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in this chapter, flag States and coastal States are obligated to cooperate in 
order to rescue any person, including asylum seekers and refugees, in distress at sea. 
The main problem, however, is the disembarkation of rescued asylum seekers. In lieu 
of a burden-sharing agreement distributing the responsibilities for refugees and 
asylum seekers, and a clear legal obligation on part of the coastal State to allow 
disembarkation and to provide temporary refuge for the applicants, this final and 
essential part of the rescue operation — the deliverance of the rescued asylum seekers 
to a ‘place of safety’ — remains to be solved on an ad-hoc basis. 
As highlighted in this chapter, there are particular situations in which the 
rescuing vessel have a right under customary international law to enter the port of any 
State, a right which the coastal State is obliged to adhere to. When the asylum seekers 
on board a rescuing vessel, by means of entering the port of a coastal State, come 
under the de jure jurisdiction of the coastal State, they are protected by the principle 
of non-refoulement. The same obligations arise when the rescuing vessel or the vessel 
carrying asylum seekers are interdicted by the coastal State. Interdiction or rescue 
leave the asylum seekers under the de facto jurisdiction of the coastal State, regardless 
of the location where the interdiction takes place. Further, this obliges the coastal State 
to ascertain that a rejection of the applicants, from port or from this de facto 
jurisdiction, will not result in the refoulement of the applicants. Such procedures 
demand due process, to establish the individual need for protection. Due process, in 
turn, demands disembarkation.  
Thus, while the clarity of the international legal framework remains 
unsatisfactory, it has been established that the coastal State is, through a combination 
of convention– and customary law, obliged to allow for the disembarkation of rescued 
asylum seekers, and to process their applications.  
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS  
	
This dissertation has sought to provide answers to a few questions topical to the current 
standing of international burden-sharing in the context of refugee law. In doing so, a 
range of international legal instruments have been analysed, with the support of both 
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international judicial decisions and the work of expert scholars in the field of refugee 
law. The fundamental observation of the dissertation has been that although the 1951 
Convention provides a generous set of rights to persecuted persons, it has, in the 
context of this dissertation, its primary shortcoming in its lack of clear and positive 
obligations which ensure a fair distribution of the burdens of refugees between the 
signatory States. However, regional efforts do, to a degree, mitigate this issue by 
establishing obligations which seek to distribute the costs and burdens of refugees. 
The findings and observations of the dissertation will be summarised in the following. 
As examined in the second chapter of this dissertation there are, unfortunately, 
no universally applicable legal obligations on States to distribute the burdens of 
refugees and asylum seekers in an egalitarian manner, neither through the resettlement 
of refugees nor through financial transfers. Nonetheless, physical relocation of 
refugees does occur, albeit based on the political will of States. Presuming that 
political decisions largely is made based on perceived national benefits, 
Schwarzenberger’s adage of self-interest being the true motivator for State 
cooperation301 still rings true today. 
However, on the regional level, the recent relocation decision302 of the Council 
of the EU, which regulates a relocation of some 120 000 refugees, recognises the 
‘necessity of ensuring a fair distribution of [asylum] applicants among Member 
States.’303 Indeed, the express purpose of the decision, as evidenced by its title, is to 
alleviate the economic and societal pressures put on Greece and Italy by the recent 
mass influx of asylum seekers. Similarly, the AMIF constitute an example of a 
regional development in cost–sharing of the burdens of refugees, achieved through the 
appropriation and pooling of economic resources which are then redistributed, 
proportionately to the burdens shouldered by each member State. Both initiatives are 
legally binding and appreciate the general duty of States to cooperate,304 albeit in a 
regional context. More importantly, the initiatives recognise that the burden of 
refugees — though limited to the European context — must be shared in order to 
ensure equal and effective protection of refugees. Such initiatives are a welcome 
adjustment which may reduce the pressure on strained EU border States such as 
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Greece, while simultaneously laying a foundation for the overall improvement of 
reception conditions for asylum seekers in the EU. Moreover, there are signs of such 
initiatives spreading outside of EU territories, as evidenced by the Cotonou 
Agreement, in which the EU has pledged humanitarian assistance to 79 countries in 
order to, among other things, ‘address the needs arising from the displacement of 
people.’305 
As examined in the third chapter, the practices of ‘safe third countries’ abound 
in the developed world, and have in the past306 infringed on the fundamental rights 
protecting persecuted persons. Unfortunately, such infringements might continue in 
the immediate future.307 In lieu of a refugee regime where the burdens of refugees are 
shared and distributed in a just and predictable manner, the concept remains an 
unpalatable, yet understandable method for determining the State responsible for 
providing asylum procedures and protection for the individual applicant. 
Unsurprisingly, this is to the detriment of asylum seekers and refugees, who risk 
refoulement at the hands of States attempting to shirk responsibilities and costs. 
Nonetheless, there is a growing recognition within the EU that such transfers need to 
be substantiated by sufficient guarantees of human–rights protections, as evidenced 
by the Dublin III and the Asylum Procedures Directive.308 To the contrary of these 
progressions, the EU is seeking to transfer asylum seekers back to Turkey, a country 
which in chapter three of this dissertation has been shown to not meet the very 
minimum standards dictated by the EU in its own regulations. 
As shown in the fourth chapter, States are liable for damages attributable to 
their forced displacement of citizens through persecution. The chapter provided that 
this liability extends towards the injured individual, as well towards as the UNHCR 
and the receiving State. That the customary rules of State responsibility as presented 
by the ILC309 are applicable to the scenario of forced displacement, is of particular 
importance in the modern refugee crisis, in which twenty people are forced to flee 
from their homes — every single minute of the day.310 This, in turn, leave them to rely 
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on what assets they are able to bring, as well as the aid provided by the UNHCR and 
the asylum State. Clearly, a justified compensation to any of these three parties — or 
all — would be most welcome. 
Moreover, there are ways in which these injured parties may seek such 
compensation from responsible States for the loss of property and the expenses of 
caring for refugees, respectively. There are historical precedents for such practice,311 
although enforcement mechanisms, and even supra–national judicial measures for 
individual refugees outside the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, are limited. Increasing the 
pressure on refugee-generating States by creating strong disincentives for the forced 
displacement of nationals is necessary in order to halt the creation of refugees, and 
pursuing a strategy of compensation may secure justified benefits, both for the people 
in need of protection, and for the States doing their humanitarian duty by extending 
protection, all while constituting a punitive and preventative measure against State–
sanctioned displacement. Importantly, the liable State would be recognised as 
responsible by the international community, which arguably in itself would further 
increase the pressure on the State to cease or prevent the activities which lead to 
displacement.  
As shown in the fifth chapter, States are responsible under international law 
for implementing legislation which obligates shipmasters flying their flag, to render 
assistance to asylum seekers in distress at sea. Moreover, all shipmasters are obliged 
to render such assistance to all persons in distress, regardless of their nationality or 
migratory status. Importantly, the principle of non-refoulement extends to rescued and 
interdicted persons. This, in turn, leaves the State under which jurisdiction the 
applicants find themselves, responsible for ascertaining that a rejection or an expulsion 
will not be to the contrary of the 1951 Convention, the CAT, ICCPR nor customary 
international law. As such investigative procedures necessitate disembarkation, the 
coastal State is by all practical means obliged to allow disembarkation and temporary 
refuge, until the individual asylum claim is disproven by official procedures 
conducted.312  
The observations made in this dissertation are relevant to both the present and 
future protection of refugees and asylum seekers. First, they illustrate the some of the 
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developments of legal obligations to share the burdens of refugees in a regional 
context. The adoptions of regional legal instruments, which seek to distribute the 
burdens resulting from forced displacement, can in turn increase the protection of 
refugees as more resources are made available to the countries which due to 
geographical location happen to receive disproportionate numbers of asylum seekers. 
Secondly, the growing application of the ‘third safe country’ concept has been showed 
to constitute a serious risk to the fundamental principle of non-refoulement. States 
engaging in this practice must, in order to avoid violations of international refugee and 
human rights law, take precautions by individually assessing the risks of the individual 
transfer. Thirdly, the punitive and reparative means that restitution and compensation 
constitute, might prove as effective means to halt the creation of refugees, while 
simultaneously providing the injured parties with much needed pecuniary support. 
Fourthly, this dissertation has shown how the principle of non-refoulement leads to an 
obligation for assessing the well-founded fear of the individual rescuee, an obligation 
which is tantamount to a responsibility for the rescuing or interdicting State to 
determine refugeehood. 
As the research of this dissertation have been limited to a selection of questions 
within the sphere of burden-sharing in refugee law, there are still many questions left 
unanswered in regard to the future of burden-sharing. This dissertation has, however, 
added weight to the notion that increased responsibility- and burden-sharing is 
imperative for the increased availability of adequate protection for refugees. 
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